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ABSTRACT  
   
The World Economic Herald was a newspaper founded in April 1980 and 
was closed down by the Chinese government in May 1989 due to its dissident 
voice.  The World Economic Herald was widely regarded as the most influential 
and important weekly newspaper in China in the 1980s.  It became the leading 
publication pushing political as well as economic reform in China.  This key 
publication in history has yet to receive much scholarly attention.  By examining 
the evolution of the World Economic Herald from 1980 to 1989, this thesis 
explores the political and financial support behind the newspaper and, more 
importantly, the changing contents of the World Economic Herald.  The year 
1985 is seen a turning point for the World Economic Herald.  After 1985, the 
World Economic Herald moved gradually toward being more of a politically 
dissident newspaper from an economic newspaper.  The changes in the political 
patronage behind the newspaper played a crucial role in the fate of the World 
Economic Herald.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), China entered 
into a new era of development under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.  The 
decade between 1979 and 1989 was a period of rapid change in China.  
Particularly at the sphere of economics, various reforming mechanisms were 
introduced and enforced.  Typical changes included: the shift from a centrally 
planned economy to a market driven economy, the introduction of various 
forms of responsibility systems, and the restructuring of the banking and 
financial sector such as the development of stocks, bonds and labor service 
markets.  Reforms on the political side, however, were not at a corresponding 
rate with economic reforms and lagged far behind.   
     The opening up of the country consequently helped the development of 
media in China.  After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power in 
1949, press and media in China were under tight control by the Chinese 
Communist government.  “In 1950, all book publishing was brought under 
the government’s General Bureau of Publications, while book selling was 
centralized in the Xinhua chain.  Magazines and newspapers were 
reorganized, with some journals being closed and the rest brought under party 
control by the mid-1950s.” 1
                                                        
1 Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy, New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random 
House, 1985, 157. 
 Especially during the years of the Cultural 
Revolution, the press was under extremely strict control by the government.  
No private publications were allowed to exist.  As scholars observed less 
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than 200 newspapers survived the onslaught of the Cultural Revolution.  Yet, 
after the launching of the reforms, one immediate change was the increased 
volume of information available through the officially sanctioned mass media.  
Disbanded publications during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated and 
new periodicals started to proliferate.  The number of newspapers increased 
to 320 nationally in 1979, immediately after the start of reforms.  Lynn White 
III noted that the first half of the 1980s was a banner period for emerging 
periodicals; more than half of the newspapers in China at the beginning of 
1986 were less than 5 years old.2  And by 1987 the number of newspapers 
rose to a total of 2,509 (only 255 of which were dailies) with a combined 
annual circulation of 25.98 billion copies.3
The main reason for this drastic increase was due to the policies of Deng 
Xiaoping, whose primary focus was economic growth.  In order to pursue 
this, it was necessary to loosen restrictions on the media.  In practice, 
businesses and enterprises were allowed to start newspapers to promote the 
exchange of business information, as well as to provide a means of advertising.  
As a result, the number of economic newspapers and magazines increased 
significantly from 1980 onwards.  According to incomplete statistics 
submitted by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, there were 130 
economic newspapers in the country by April 1985, excluding hundreds of 
smaller economic newspapers run by grass-roots units and distributed in small 
  
                                                        
2 Li Cheng and Lynn T. White III, "China's technocratic movement and the World 
Economic Herald," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 1991), 344. 
3 Cheng and White III, “China’s Technocratic Movement”, 344. 
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cities, towns, or counties. 4   This drastic increase without doubt was 
fundamentally tied to the goal of reform by the Chinese government.  For the 
CCP, media has been an effective tool of propaganda.  Hence as tools of 
propaganda, the press and mass media are used to help promote economic 
reforms as well as to mobilize the masses to participate.  In this sense, 
economic newspapers were playing an increasingly significant role in the 
nation’s economic development, and they are closely integrated with the 
nation’s recent economic reforms.5
The Shanghai based World Economic Herald (Shijie jingji daobao) was 
one of the most influential Chinese newspapers in the 1980s.  The Herald has 
been well known as China’s most liberal and outspoken newspaper.  It was 
founded in June 1980 and was forced to close by the Chinese Communist 
government in May 1989.  At the same year, in June, massive numbers of 
Chinese students marched into Tiananmen Square protesting for democracy.  
In eyes of most scholars, the Herald played a crucial role in triggering the 
student pro-democracy movement in 1989 [Nathan, 1989; Wright, 1990; Hsiao 
and Yang, 1989].
 
6
                                                        
4 Won Ho Chang, Mass Media in China: the History and the Future.  Ames : Iowa 
State University Press, 1989, 131. 
  The goal of this study, therefore, is to explain how the 
5 “Dangxia zhongguo de jingji xinwen baozhi” [Economic Newspapers in Present 
Day China], Xinwen Zhanxian [Journalistic Front], January 6 1986,5. 
6 See, Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democrac, 152-171 
Hsiao Ching-chang and Yang Mei-rong, “Don’t Force to Lie: The Case of the World 
Economic Herald.” In Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China: the Interplay of Politics and 
Journalism, New York : Guilford Press, 1990: 111-121 
Kate Wright, "The political fortunes of Shanghai's World Economic Herald," 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 23 (January 1990): 121-132. 
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Herald came into existence and developed into a leading politically dissident 
newspaper, and why a liberal newspaper could emerge and survive in China at 
that time.  
     Founded in 1980, the Herald quickly took over the market and became 
one of China’s most influential newspapers after publication of several initial 
issues.  The success of the Herald, as some scholars suggest, was due to the 
“independent” nature of the paper.  Different from most other state-controlled 
newspapers, the Herald was independent from its founding.  Because it was 
self- financed, the Herald was relatively free from institutional links to the 
government [Hsiao and Yang, 1989]. 7   The Herald therefore has been 
commonly considered as an “unofficial” newspaper in China.  As Kate 
Wright noted, the Herald “is by far the most famous of the handful 
“unofficial” publications that have emerged in China since the introduction of 
economic reforms.”8
     As its title suggests, the World Economic Herald was a newspaper about 
economics.  It not only covered world economic news, but also commented 
on the domestic economic situation.    To be more specific, the newspaper 
introduced new ideas about new economic development and economic 
management both at home and abroad, popularized economic knowledge, and 
exchanged research results concerning both the national economy and global 
   
                                                        
7 Hsiao Ching-chang and Yang Mei-rong, “Don’t Force to Lie.”: 111-121 
8 Kate Wright, "The political fortunes“121. 
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economic relations.9  In the periods of reforms (the 1980s), the nature of 
reporting on economics certainly contributed to the success of the Herald.  
Indeed, scholar Chang Won Ho argued for a positive relationship between the 
Herald and China’s economic reconstruction project.  As Ho suggested, the 
role of the Herald in promoting China’s economic reforms has been widely 
recognized.  Among the economic newspapers generated in those years, the 
Herald was considered “as an authority on both world and national economic 
issues.”10 Also because of its influence, “the Chinese government used the 
newspaper to test the practicability of new policies.”11
     Chang’s student Ni Hua further advanced this claim.  In her 1987 MA 
thesis “World Economic Herald: a Case Study of Economic Newspapers in 
China”, Ni studied the Herald as an economic newspaper from 1980 to 1985.  
Ni concluded that the Herald played a positive role in China’s economic 
reforms; it did support the policies of the Party and the government in its news 
coverage and its treatment of the news content.  The Herald presented itself 
as a showcase in which the general public could see changing economic 
situations outside China; it also functioned as a window through which the 
outside world could observe the economic development in China.
 
12
     Why was an economic newspaper shut down by the Chinese 
 
                                                        
9 “Weile zhongguo de xiandaihua—shijie jingji daobao de guoqu wunian” [For 
China’s Modernization—Five years of the World Economic Herald], Jiefang Ribao 
[Liberation Daily], July 4 1985, 3. 
10 Chang, Mass Media, 131. 
11 Chang, Mass Media, 131. 
12 Ni Hua, World Economic Herald: a case study of economic newspapers in China, 
unpublished MA Thesis, University of Missouri, 1987, 119. 
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government in 1989?  The evolution of the Herald into a dissident newspaper 
has been examined and analyzed by a number of scholars.  But most of them 
have focused on the political impact of the Herald.  Li Cheng and Lynn 
White III in their article “China’s Technocratic Movement and the World 
Economic Herald” have argued that the development of the World Economic 
Herald was closely connected to China’s technocratic movement.  The 
Herald helped promote the idea of “science” and “democracy.”  In Cheng and 
White’s view, “Chinese political development in the 1980s was primarily 
technocratic.” 13   In 1978, there were only few top posts occupied by 
technocrats, but more and more top posts were filled by technocrats from 1978 
onwards.  As they have argued, there was a dramatic shift in cadre policy that 
promoted technocrats, and this change was “part of an elitist movement in 
which the World Economic Herald played a critical role.”14
With the goal of democracy promotion, the Herald from 1986 on 
dauntlessly challenged national leaders to undertake vital political reforms 
[Hsiao and Yang, 1989]
   
15
                                                        
13 Cheng and White III, “China’s Technocratic Movement”, 344. 
.  In reporting political news, the editors adopted a 
technique metaphorically referred to as “hitting line balls” (cha bian qiu) 
—aiming for the very edge of the ping-pong table to the edge of the 
permissible in China.  The role of the Herald in accelerating the growth of 
democracy in China therefore stood out among the Chinese news media 
14 Cheng and White III, “China’s Technocratic Movement”, 343. 
15 See Hsiao Ching-chang and Yang Mei-rong, “Don’t Force to Lie.”: 111-121. 
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[Nathan, 1986]16.  As a result of democracy promotion, the Herald directly 
triggered the pro-democracy student movement of 1989.  Kate Wright noted, 
“The story of the demise of the Herald is in many ways a history of the 
democracy movement in Shanghai and a barometer of the political climate 
throughout the seven-week-long protest in China’s largest city.”17
According to these scholars, the economic growth and political 
development had direct impacts on the press in China.  As scholar 
Chin-Chuan Lee pointed out: “the fate of media reform has followed the swing 
of political pendulum during the 1980s. Press freedom gained ground when 
economic and political reforms surged ahead, but it lost momentum when they 
retreated.”
   
18
 
  The Herald’s forced termination after the Tiananmen 
crackdown, therefore, symbolized the re-imposition of heavy-handed controls 
over the press and presaged rough times ahead for media reformers.   
     Although the Herald has received certain amount of attention from 
scholars, available works on the history of the Herald are few.  Detailed 
scholarly analysis about the Herald is particularly deficient.  There are many 
questions that still remain ambiguous or unanswered, such as the origin, 
operation, and nature of this newspaper.  For example, how did the Herald 
come into existence and evolve into a leading dissident newspaper? Why did 
                                                        
16 Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy, 152-171. 
17 Wright, “The political fortunes”, 122. 
18 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China: the Interplay of Politics and Journalism, New 
York : Guilford Press, 1990, 7. 
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none of its contemporary papers come even close to its prominence and 
achievement? And more importantly, was it truly independent, as scholars 
described?  The “independent” and “official” view as described earlier in 
many ways is problematic.  This view simplifies and obscures the complex 
relationship that the Herald had with Chinese reform-minded officials, 
particularly the Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobao administration.   Noteworthy to 
mention is that the Herald had a very powerful board of directors and advisors, 
including the mayor and vice mayor of Shanghai, members of the Central 
Committee of the Party, and the director of special commissions under the 
State Council.  The patron-client relationship between these intellectuals and 
political leaders certainly granted them protections.  In Timothy Cheek and 
Carol Lee Hamrin’s view, they were establishment intellectuals that “primarily 
engaged in intellectual activities that define the ‘ultimate’ or the ideal…and 
have affirmed, accepted and served the ruling authorities.” 19  These 
establishment intellectuals held a “higher kind of loyalty” to the government. 
They criticized Maoist radicalism but endorsed the idea of Marxism-Leninism 
generally and accepted the political legitimacy of the Communist regime.  In 
this way, “as a subgroup within the ruling elite,” establishment intellectuals 
collaborated in a system in which the party occupied the ultimate power of 
control and authority.20
                                                        
19 Cheek and Hamrin, China’s Establishment Intellectuals. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. 
Sharpe, 1986, 3-4. 
   
20 Cheek and Hamrin, China’s Establishment Intellectuals, 3. 
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In light of this, it is therefore not hard to conclude reasons why the 
Herald was tolerated by the CCP regime.  But other questions rise: when and 
how did the Herald challenge the Party’s censorship and interference? And 
what caused this?  Why was the Herald suspended by the government 
eventually? By examining the evolution of the Herald, one can see not only 
the reasons behind the Herald’s shut down, but more important, the relations 
between media reform and the pro-democracy movement.   
 
     The purpose of this study, as stated earlier, is to analyze the rise and 
demise of the World Economic Herald, particularly its role in the reforms of 
the 1980s.  Due to the limited amount of scholarship on this newspaper, the 
study have had to rely on primary sources.  The study is based on content 
analysis by analyzing the Herald from 1980 to 1989.  From 1980 to 1989, 
there were a total of 441 issues published by the Herald.  The study will go 
through these issues and identify patterns or changes in the Herald’s reporting 
during the years.  In addition, the study will look at other newspapers and 
periodicals published during the same years for any relevant information about 
the Herald.  This will include the Chinese-language newspapers and 
periodicals: China Journalism Yearbook (Zhongguo xinwen nianjian), the 
People’s Daily (Renmin ribao), Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao), Weihui Daily 
(Weihui bao), New China Monthly (Xinhua Yuekan), and Commonwealth; and 
the English-language newspapers the New York Times, and South China 
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Morning Post.  It will be argued that the Herald was important in promoting 
economic and political changes in China.  The rise and demise of the Herald, 
however, elucidates the relationship between the pro-democracy movement 
and China’s media reform.  The Herald was not established as a dissident 
newspaper, its evolution towards political dissent was tied to the changing of 
political climate of the 1980s.  It will also be argued that although the Herald 
claimed to be an “independent” newspaper, it was not completely independent 
from the control of the government or other groups.  Yet its “semi-official” 
status assured quality news and commentaries that were unprecedented 
compared to other contemporary publications.  This study is divided into five 
chapters.  Chapter I—Introduction—outlines the nature and research 
questions of the study; includes a literature review on the subject and an 
explanation of research methodology.  Chapter II provides a historical 
background of China’s reforms of the 1980s including media reform.  
Chapter III describes the structure of the Herald and its changing editorial 
policies between 1980 and 1989. Chapter IV by content analysis it examines 
the newspaper’s publication issue by issue over 9 years.  The chapter 
examines the evolution of the Herald, particularly its turning from an 
“economic herald” to a “political herald,” and reasons behind this.   Chapter 
V will summarize the findings of the research and make concluding remarks. 
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Chapter II.  China’s Reforms in the 1980s 
 
Economic Reform 
     After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government 
launched its reform projects under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping.  
Among others, the economy was the primary target of the Chinese government.  
The goal of the Chinese government was to transform China’s old centrally 
planned economy to a newly price-oriented market one.  Starting in 1979, 
economic reforms; particularly rural economic reforms were first being 
introduced in China.  Aimed at emancipating China’s 800 million peasants 
from poverty and modernizing the rural economic structure and system, the 
rural economic reforms consist of two major components: 1) the introduction 
of various types of responsibility system and; 2) the adjustment of China’s 
rural economic structure.  
     The responsibility system aimed to link agricultural output to peasants’ 
income, to “grant the right of self-determination for the collective economy to 
the localities and to pay attention to the peasants’ material interests in order to 
stimulate their enthusiasm for work.”21
                                                        
21 See SJJJDB, November 30, 1981.  
  The responsibility system proved 
successful as it not only related income to output, but also provided farmers 
with incentives to produce.  It has greatly liberalized productivity in the rural 
areas.  By 1984, 5.69 million production teams in China’s countryside had 
adopted the responsibility system, with fewer than 2,000 teams left to continue 
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the traditional pattern.22   By 1986, 180 million—98 percent of the total 
farming households in China—had moved into various forms of the 
responsibility system.23
Later on, with the success of reform in rural areas, the Chinese 
government launched reform in urban areas.  Starting from 1984, a market 
economy began emerging in China’s cities; incentive and reward mechanisms 
based on performance were introduced; stocks, bonds and labor service 
markets emerged; separation of ownership from managerial authority was 
emphasized; and more autonomy was given to enterprises to “decide on 
investment, research and development, production, marketing, prices, and 
personnel matters.”
    
24
The whole process of these urban economic reforms was accompanied 
by strong resistance from conservative Party officials.  They argued that the 
urban economic reforms went too far and needed brakes.  For instance, Li 
Peng, former Prime Minister of China, emphasized that it was not yet the time 
  Meanwhile, in order to attract foreign investment and 
technology, special economic zones were set up in China.  China’s urban 
economic reform was targeted for a shift from direct to indirect regulation, and 
from micro to macro control.  
                                                        
22 “Report assesses rural economic reforms”, China Daily, January 28, 1987.  
Quoted from, Xu Yu, The press, and social change: a case study of the 'World 
economic herald' in China's political reform. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Iowa, 1991 
23 “Report assesses rural economic reforms”, China Daily, January 28, 1987. 
Quoted from, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
24 E.J. Perry and C.Wong eds, The Political Economic of Reform in Post-Mao China. 
Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard University Press. 1980. 
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to adopt private ownership; the China’s privatization should be a slowly 
process.  With the resistance coming from conservative officials such as this, 
it is not hard to see why political reforms lagged far behind economic reforms.  
Compared with the success of economic reforms, political reforms 
stagnated in the 1980s.  The Chinese government was reluctant to carry out 
political reforms.  In order to divert public attention from potential political 
changes, the government repeatedly stressed the importance of economic 
reforms.  This could be illustrated by the news reporting coverage at that time.  
Newspapers such as the Party organ the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) gave 
heavy coverage to rural economic reform between 1979 and 1983, while they 
selectively ignored issues relating to political reform.  
 
Press Reform 
     The press in China has been tightly controlled by the Chinese 
government.  Under the regime of the CCP, the press has been used to agitate 
and motivate the people to support and follow the line and policies of the 
Party.25
                                                        
25 Ni Hua, World Economic Herald, 30. 
  One typical feature of the Chinese press under the CCP has been its 
use for propaganda.  Having established its own propaganda department, the 
CCP used propaganda to gather support for Party policies and programs since 
its founding.  For the CCP, press became the most effective tool to mobilize 
and educate people.  Through the newspaper, Party leaders could 1) have 
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access to every major social group and the means to advertise Party policies 
and; 2) demoralize any opposition voices by using the press.26  In the words 
of Mao Zedong, “The role and power of the newspapers consist in their ability 
to bring the Party program, the Party line, the Party’s general and specific 
policies, its tasks and methods of work before the masses in the quickest and 
most extensive way.”27
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the degree 
of government control of the press increased.  In the PRC, all mass media are 
owned and operated, directly or indirectly, by the Party.  Private ownership is 
not permitted.  The Party controlled all mass media through its Propaganda 
Department and makes the media its tool and “mouthpiece” for its own 
interests.  The Propaganda Department is directly controlled by the Party’s 
politburo; it has branches in each province, autonomous region, and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government.  All newspapers, 
magazines, publications, presses and news agencies and television and radio 
stations are absolutely controlled by the Party’s Propaganda Department. The 
Media and Publications Bureau’s view on illegal publications is that “any 
newspapers, journals, books, audio and video tapes which are publicized 
socially without the government’s permission are illegal and will be subject to 
   
                                                        
26 Patricia Stranahan, Molding the Medium: The Chinese Communist Party and the 
Liberation Daily. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990. 
27 Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol.4, 1965, 241. 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
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confiscation, destruction and punishment.”28  When the newspaper shaped 
events, it must to do so within the framework of the accepted Party line.  As 
Judy Polumbaum says in her article, one of the major reasons why 
“hegemonic communication has prevailed over petitionary communication in 
China, is because the state owns the major channels of mass 
communication.”29  Lu Dingyi, former head of the Propaganda Ministry, 
once said: “The press is an instrument of class struggle. It is one of the 
weapons used by the proletarian class to overthrow capitalism and to build up 
socialism. It must be tightly controlled by the government.”30  In addition, 
the media in China must to subject itself to self-censorship.  As Judy 
Polumbaum says, “journalists in China have been assigned a difficult 
balancing act as intermediaries between the nation’s political authorities and 
the public. They are instructed to serve as both ‘eyes, ears, and mouthpiece’ of 
the Chinese Communist Party and government and ‘eyes, ears, and 
mouthpiece’ of the people.”31
 
  
     Nonetheless, the Chinese press in the 1980s went remarkable changes.  
The first observable change was the significant increase in the number of 
newspapers.  The number of newspapers rose to 320 nationally at the start of 
the economic reforms in 1979, in contrast to less than 200 newspapers of the 
                                                        
28 “Urgent call for reform of the Chinese Media”, China Daily, December 1, 1987. 
29 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China, 7. 
30 See Xinhua Monthly (Xinhua yuebao), Vol. 8, 1987, 133. 
31 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China, 33. 
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end of the Cultural Revolution.32  Second and more important were changes 
in the structure as well as the content genres of newspapers.  In the 1980s, 
coverage on investigative reports and human interest stories increased.  
“While Party organs produced 16% of the total titles of publication, there was 
a steep rise in the volume of varied publications ranging from 
targeted-pop-papers (23%), to enterprise papers (25%).”33 This is in stark 
contrast to the Cultural Revolution era when only Party organs were allowed 
to publish.  In addition, journalism education expanded rapidly; Western 
influences were prominent in China at that time.  The open-door policy not 
only brought Western journalism educators to China, but also introduced 
Western notions of journalism into curricula and textbooks.34
The change in the press to a great extent was due to economic reforms.  
In correspondence to the economic reforms starting from 1979, the Chinese 
press shifted its focus from class struggle and political mobilization to 
economic reconstruction.  Consequently, coverage of economic news 
increased and became the primary area of reporting.  News coverage now 
contained more information on social news and less propaganda.  
Newspapers became more readable and approachable.   
 
However, these changes on the press did not touch the fundamental 
structure of the press system.  Most of the innovations were merely limited to 
                                                        
32 See Brantly Womack, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Media and the Chinese Public: 
A Survey of the Beijing Media Audience, a special issue of Chinese Sociology and 
Anthropology. 3-4, 1986,16-29. 
33 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China,16. 
34 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China, 40. 
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technical or operational aspects.  The role of the news media as a propaganda 
tool remained unchanged.  The Chinese government was actually reluctant to 
implement a complete reform in journalism and newspapers.  This reluctance 
can be illustrated by the ups and downs of press reform in the 1980s.  The 
voices for press reform in 1986 were increased, while during the campaigns 
against “bourgeois liberalization,” the journalistic reform efforts cooled; but 
before and after the 13th CCP Congress in 1987, the “wind of press reform 
rose again.”35  The CCP actually tried hard to keep the press as a tool of 
propaganda.  Deng Xiaoping said at the beginning of the reform in 1980: 
“newspapers need to be the supporting base for the government, to propagate 
good things of socialism, and the rightness of Marx-Leninism and Mao’s 
thought.” 36   Hu Yaobang, former General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee, said that although journalistic 
institutions are managed as a kind of enterprise, they are above all mass media 
organizations—“No matter how many reforms are introduced, the nature of 
the Party’s journalism cannot be changed.”37
                                                        
35 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China, 104. 
 In a meeting in February 8, 1985, 
Hu emphasized: “The journalist cause of the Party should serve as the organ of 
the Party by the nature of it. This is justified and must not be abandoned…The 
journalist work of the Party must speak for the Party and government, give 
36 Zhongguo xinwen nianjian [China Journalism Yearbook], Research Institute of 
Journalism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, comp., (Beijing: Chinese Social 
Sciences Publishing House), 1986. 
37 Won Ho Chang, Mass Media in China, 57. 
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opinion and guidance in accordance with the line and policy of the Party.”38  
In this sense, the increasingly diversified reporting did not translate into the 
Western sense of increased relative autonomy.  Rather, these changes still 
reflected Party policies—they were aimed to carry out Party-defined goals and 
tasks.39
Also, the Seventh Five-Year plan in 1985 pointed out that “Journalistic 
units must correctly propagate the Party’s line, principles, and policies while at 
the same time satisfy the people’s various needs for information dissemination, 
knowledge diffusion, cultural entertainment, etc.”
  
40  In 1986, Zhu Houze, the 
head of the Propaganda Department, stressed that “press reform is different 
from the entire economic reform. It is not a fundamental reform. Its purpose is 
to perfect the socialist system.”41
     In 1987, officials at the State Media and Publication Office stressed that 
any publication without the state’s permission was illegal and had to be 
severely punished. The current Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin at the 
time articulated that mass media in China must be in the firm hands of genuine 
Marxists so as to avoid any Westernizing deviation as exemplified by the 
Herald.  Li Ruihuan, another leading Party official, also reemphasized that 
the Chinese mass media must give priority to the Party’s positive propaganda.  
 
                                                        
38 “Zai dang de lingdaoxia de baoye” [On the Journalism under the Party] RMRB, 
April 4 1985, 1. 
39 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China,16. 
40 See Wenhui Daily (Wenhui Bao), October 14, 1985, 2. 
Quoted from, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, Unpublished PhD thesis, 1991 
41 See Xinhua Monthly (Xinhua Yuebao), No. 10, 1986, 140. 
Quoted from, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, Unpublished PhD thesis, 1991 
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     Apparently, the CCP did not want a substantive reform of the press.  
As a result, censorship and state interferences were still common throughout 
1980s.  Due to the CCP’s reluctance to conduct political reforms, it is not 
surprising that changes of the press were limited to quantitative and 
operational terms.  As Liu Binyan said, “in the last decade, China’s press 
freedom has increased, but it should be noted that this is not something that 
the CCP desired.”42  At the beginning of the reform, the Party consciously 
expanded press freedom in two or three papers in Beijing, including the Party 
organ the People’s Daily.  But even in those 2 years, the People’s Daily staff 
constantly received phone calls of condemnation, asking why this or that 
article was published and why some statements were printed.43
 
  As Liu 
Binyan said, “although the CCP never wanted to grant more freedom, the 
people’s freedom has increased in the last 10 years—not because of the 
benevolence of the Party, but because of the impact of the economic reforms 
and people taking advantage of the reforms.”  
The Herald and Shanghai Press 
  
     Since the end of the nineteenth-century, Shanghai has developed into 
one of the biggest industrial and commercial center of China.  As early as the 
1930s, Shanghai’s economic importance had already been widely recognized.  
                                                        
42 Liu Binyan, “Press Freedom: Particles in the Air” in Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of 
China: the Interplay of Politics and Journalism, New York : Guilford Press, 1990. 
Also see, Liu Binyan, A higher Kind of Loyalty : a memoir by China's foremost 
journalist, New York : Pantheon Books, 1990. 
43 Liu Binyan, “Press Freedom: Particles in the Air”, 201  
 20 
After the founding of the PRC, Shanghai continued as a commercial center.  
Since 1949, Shanghai has played a significant role in China’s economy and 
occupied a special position in China’s economic development.  Shanghai’s 
fiscal income accounts for about eight to ten percent of the nation’s annual 
revenue.  According to the statistics of 1984, the average per capita income 
in Shanghai was $1,400, far above the national average per capita income of 
$300.  
     In addition to its economic importance, Shanghai played a crucial role in 
China’s press development.  Shanghai has a long history of being a press and 
media center.  Shen Bao [Shanghai News], one of China’s earliest and most 
influential modern newspapers was founded and run in Shanghai.  Xinwen 
Bao [Newspaper of Current Affairs], China’s first business newspaper, was 
also started in Shanghai.  The newspaper industry of Shanghai was well 
developed before the PRC and had assembled a large group of professional 
newspaper people.  Clearly recognizing the importance of Shanghai’s press, 
the CCP paid particular attention to managing and controlling the press of 
Shanghai in the 1950s after the founding of the PRC.  Indeed, the CCP 
launched a series of reforms in Shanghai’s press.  The Shanghai press has 
played a key role in CCP’s nationhood recreation project.   
     With the opening to the outside world in the late 1970s, Shanghai 
immediately became an open port city.  As an industrial and commercial 
center, the city’s business activities significantly increased in correspondence 
 21 
to the rapid development of the national economy and the Party’s 
modernization drive.  As a result, economic newspapers started to emerge in 
Shanghai.  In 1980, one year after the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee passed the decision on China’s economic reforms, the World 
Economic Herald was born in Shanghai. 
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Chapter III. The Founding of the Herald: An Institutional Base 
     With the purpose of “reflecting different opinions, especially new 
thoughts, if they are helpful to China’s reforms and openness,”44
 
 the World 
Economic Herald was founded in Shanghai on June 21, 1980.   The paper 
was co-sponsored by the Chinese Society of World Economics and the 
Shanghai Research Institute of World Economy of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences.  Founded as a bi-weekly newspaper with eight pages, the 
Herald expanded itself to a weekly with 14-16 pages during its 9 years of 
existence.  
Financial Base      
     Scholars commonly consider the Herald an “unofficial” newspaper that 
separated from newspapers run by the Party [Wright, 1990; Hsiao and Yang, 
1989].45
                                                        
44 See SJJJDB, February 27, 1989, 1.  
  Although the “unofficial” stance of the Herald is disputable and 
needs further discussion, the Herald was truly an independent newspaper 
financially.  The paper was founded without the financial support from the 
government.  The paper paid taxes, salaries of the staff, and other fees on its 
own.  The Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli obtained twenty thousand yuan of 
prepaid advertising money, and borrowed an office, desks, and some chairs 
from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences to start the Herald.  Because 
of financial difficulties during its early days, the Herald did not own any 
printing houses or have typesetters.  Qin leased a small room from the 
45 See Kate Wright, "The political fortunes”: 121-132. 
Hsiao Ching-chang and Yang Mei-rong, “Don’t Force to Lie”: 111-121 
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Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao), an influential CCP paper; shared copy 
readers with Shanghai Youth (Shanghai qingnian bao), Shanghai Yi Bao and 
other papers, and worked in the Liberation’s printing room.  The major 
financial resource of the Herald was from advertisements: the paper had an 
advertisement section of four or more pages.  This section greatly helped the 
financial situation of the paper: as the paper’s influence and circulation 
increased, more and more people chose the paper for advertising.  Also 
thanks to its financial independence, the Herald was able to break “away from 
the higher-level financial department’s strict regulations.”46  Since it was 
financially independent, the paper conducted personnel recruitment itself:  
Qin and other founders of the paper searched for editors and reporters 
themselves. The propaganda department therefore could not easily interfere in 
the paper’s editorial directions since they gave it no money.  As its former 
editors articulated, this financial independence in turn “gave the Herald a little 
more autonomy and freedom.”47
 
 
 
Personnel 
     Headed by Qin Benli, the Herald was founded by a group of senior 
Chinese journalists, economists, and veteran Party officials with an average 
age of over 60 at the time.  Qian Junrui, the director of the Herald, was a 
well-known economist and was once the Beijing Bureau Chief of Xinhua 
                                                        
46 Meirong Yang, “The Case of the World Economic Herald”, in Chin-Chuan Lee, 
Voices of China: the Interplay of Politics and Journalism, New York : Guilford Press, 
1990, 186. 
47 Meirong Yang, “The Case of the World Economic Herald” 186. 
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News Agency, Vice Minister of Culture, and head of the Chinese Society of 
World Economics.  Qin Benli, the chief editor of the Herald had once been 
the Executive Deputy Chief Editor and Party Secretary of Weihui Daily, and 
Associate Director of the Shanghai Institute of World Economy (the director is 
responsible for the overall management and operation of the paper, and the 
chief editor is for editorial content).   More importantly, most of the Herald’s 
editors had suffered during Mao’s Cultural Revolution.  For instance, both 
Qian and Qin were persecuted in the 1950s.  Qin was labeled as rightist in 
1957 and was forced to leave his position at Wenhui Daily; and during the 
Cultural Revolution, Qin was sent to a labor camp in Feng Xian county near 
Shanghai.  Similarly, Qian was also sent to prison for eight years during the 
Cultural Revolution.  Rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution, Qin 
became the Associate Director of the Shanghai Research Institute of World 
Economy, and Qian became Director of the Institute of World Economy of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as well as Professor of Economics at 
Peking University.  
The Herald had an advisory committee, which was responsible for the 
paper’s policies and direction.  Almost all members of the committee were 
leading national scholars and Party officials that included former Shanghai 
mayor Wang Daohan, famous economist Huan Xiang, Xue Muqiao, Ma Hong, 
and Yu Guangyuan.  Table 1 lists the names and positions of the Herald’s 
board of directors and advisory council: 
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TABLE 3.1: Board of Directors and Advisory Committee of the World 
Economic Herald in 1983 
 
Name Position in the Herald Positions at other places 
Qian Junrui Director Director, Institute of World Economy, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences; President, 
Society of World Economics; Standing 
Committee Member of Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference 
Qin Benli Editor-in-Chief 
Vice Director 
Associate Director, Institute of World 
Economy, Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences; Standing Committee Member of 
Shanghai People’s Political Consultative 
Conference 
Huan Xiang Honorary Director Director, International Studies Center, State 
Council; Standing Committee Member of the 
National People’s Congress; President, 
International Law Society 
Wang Daohan Honorary Director Mayor of Shanghai 
Xin Yuanxi Director Vice Mayor of Shanghai 
Xue Muqiao Senior Advisor Standing Committee Member of Chinese 
People’s Political Consultive Conference; 
Director General, Economic Research Center, 
State Council 
Yu Guangyuan Senior Advisor Member of Central Advisory Commission of 
the Chinese Communist Party; President, 
Society of Territorial Economics; Vice 
President, China International Cultural 
Exchange Center 
Chen 
Hansheng 
Senior Advisor Senior advisor of Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences; Advisor, Society of World 
Economics 
Xu Dixin Senior Advisor Standing Committee Member of Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference; 
Honorary President, Society of Foreign 
Economic Theories 
Ma Hong  Senior Advisor Alternate Member, Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party; Director General, 
Technical Economics Research Center, State 
Council 
Xu Xuehan Senior Advisor Director, Economic Research Center, State 
Council 
Sun Huairen Senior Advisor Vice President, Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences 
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Chu Baoyi Senior Advisor Director, Society of World Economics 
See Li Cheng and Lynn T. White III, "China's technocratic movement and the World 
Economic Herald," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3  
 
Interestingly, most of the Herald’s advisors were members of the Society of 
World Economics, which was founded on 28 April of 1980—two months 
before the establishment of the Herald.  We therefore can say that the Society 
of World Economics had direct connection to the founding of the Herald.  
The Herald had a distinguished board of advisors made up of leading national 
scholars or political elites.  These patron-client ties not only distinguished the 
Herald from other newspapers, but also greatly helped the Herald in its 
development. These advisors provided the Herald with very important support 
and help.  
 
 
Goals of the Herald 
The goals of the Herald can be illustrated by its name.  Originally, the 
Herald planned to use the name of “World Economy”, but with the advice 
from Qian Junrui, Qin Benli decided to change the name to “World Economic 
Herald” (Shijie jingji daobao), which the word “Herald” in Chinese means 
“leading and pioneering.”  The rationale for such a name, according to Qin, 
was because the Herald “aimed to clear the way for reforms and opening”; 
pioneering and innovating therefore were necessary.   
The purpose of the Herald was to introduce advanced ideas and 
experiences from foreign countries to help China’s economic reforms; “to let 
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the world understand China, and to let China understand the world.”48
As China is opening itself to the outside world, China needs to 
understand the outside world.  Construction of China’s socialist 
modernization is closely linked with the world’s economy.  To meet 
the needs of developing circumstances, World Economic Herald has 
been initiated…We hope that this economic newspaper will become a 
window through which our readers can see and understand the outside 
world and make some contributions to the construction of the socialist 
modernization of our nation.
  In the 
trial edition of the Herald, there was a “Message to Readers” that stated: 
49
With the goal of pioneering for reforms, Qin stated, “the Herald must be bold 
and insightful.”
 
50  He emphasized: “the Herald is not the organ of any 
municipality, government, or party.  The Paper belongs to the scholars and 
reformers who support China’s economic transformation.”51  In support of 
this, the Herald maintained that the paper should be practical and realistic and 
that it should voice its own views and opinions.  Editors of the Herald shared 
and strictly adhered to this view; they often said that running a newspaper is 
not just a profession but a cause; they should close down the newspaper if they 
could not make it vivid and appealing for its readers.52
Successfully the Herald made its fame for being bold.  Shi Ximing, 
former deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee, said that newspapers should have their 
 
                                                        
48 Zhang Weiguo, Qin Benli de cha bian qiu [Playing at the edge : Qin Benli and his 
journalistic practice]. Brookline, MA : Er shi yi shi ji Zhongguo ji jin hui, 2000.20 
49 “Laizi renmin ribao de yifengxin” [A Message from Renmin ribao], June 20, 1980, 
1. 
50 “Play the political touch ball.” Commonwealth, June 1, 1989, 55-57. 
51 D.R. Shanor, “China’s Trumpet of Reform,” World Press Review, October 1987, 
38. 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
52 “Weile zhongguo de xiandaihua” [For the Modernization of China], Jiefang Ribao 
[Liberation Daily], July 4, 1985, 3. 
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own voices and definite views and that they should be clear what they are for 
and what they are against.  He praised the Herald highly, saying, “You have 
done a very good job in this respect. You are very appealing to readers and 
there is a strong voice in your pages.”53
 
 
Readership and Distribution 
     The circulation of the Herald had a significant increase after its 
establishment in 1980.  As Table 3.3 suggests, the circulation of the Herald 
experienced a continuous increase between the years of 1980 and 1984 and 
reached its peak in 1984, which was about 303,500 copies per week.  In 
addition to its large circulation numbers, the Herald had a diverse network of 
distribution: it was not only distributed in China, but also nearly 60 foreign 
countries.  Certainly, compared with other big newspapers especially 
government-supported ones, the circulation of the Herald was not significant.  
But the influence of the paper was much more than its circulation numbers 
indicate.  In foreign distribution, the Herald only lagged behind the People’s 
Daily, the biggest and the most authoritative newspaper in China.54
In addition to distribution, the composition of readership of the Herald 
was very important.  The Herald was a newspaper run by intellectuals, and its 
readers were primarily intellectuals, too.  As Qin Benli said, “the levels of the 
Herald’s readers are higher, which includes the policy-making circle in 
 
                                                        
53 “Zhuhe yu xiwang” [Congratulations and Hopes] , SJJJDB, June 20, 1985, 2. 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
54 “Dangxia zhongguo de jingji xinwen baozhi” [Economic Newspapers in Present 
Day China], Xinwen Zhanxian (Journalistic Front), January 6 1986,5. 
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governments, especially those reform-minded government officials; 
intellectuals, especially university teachers and college students; theoretical 
circles: researchers on world and domestic economy; and managers of 
enterprises.” 55
The Herald enjoyed great popularity among the Chinese people at all 
levels.  It gained high praise among top leaders, particularly reform-minded 
ones.  Qian Junrui once said that the high government officials and 
influential economists he knew all considered the paper a good and successful 
one.
 The composition of readership directly contributed to the 
paper’s success.   
56  The most significant figure would be the former Prime Minister Zhao 
Zhiyang.  According to Zhao’s secretary, the Herald became the first Monday 
reading of Zhao, and Zhao always recommended what he considered valuable 
articles to other party and government officials.  Shi Ximin, deputy director 
of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee, once wrote to the Herald, “I enjoy reading your paper, you are the 
agitator of the four modernizations and the propagator of the economic 
reforms.” 57
                                                        
55 See SJJJDB, February 27, 1989, 1. 
  Other top leaders, such as Zhu Houzhe, the head of the 
Propaganda Department was a strong supporter of the Herald; Ren Zhongyi, 
the first Party Secretary of Guangdong, and Guo Feng, the First Party 
56 Qian Junrui, “Tongguo shijie jingji daobao de yunzuo kan xinshidai de xinwen 
gongzuo” [To Explore the Newspaper Work in the New Era by Looking at the 
Operation of World Economic Herald], Shijie jingji yu zhongguo jingji [World 
Economics and China Economics] Shanghai, Fudan University Press, 1983, 8. 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
57 “Zhuhe yu xiwang” [Congratulations and Hopes], SJJJDB June 20, 1985, 2. 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
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Secretary of Liaoning, sent memoranda to government officials in their 
provinces, urging them to read the Herald regularly. 58
The Herald gained its reputation for being bold and insightful also 
among intellectuals and students.  One professor at the Southwest 
Transportation University in China said that the Herald was a good paper for 
intellectuals and it had touched upon many delicate economic issues that 
nobody dared to try in the past.  One student at Beijing Business School 
wrote to the editor in 1982, saying that of fifty students in his class, 
thirty-seven subscribed to the Herald.
 The officials in 
Shanghai economic departments also wrote to the Herald saying that they 
were the Herald’s faithful readers and they were very much interested in the 
attractive content of the newspaper. 
59  And one young reader wrote to the 
Herald expressing his thanks to the Herald for helping him make up his mind 
to become a businessman.60
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
58 See SJJJDB, August 19, 1984, 1. 
59 See SJJJDB, June 21, 1982, 7. 
Cheng and White III, “China’s Technocratic Movement”, 344 
60 Cheng and White III, “China’s Technocratic Movement”, 344 
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TABLE 3.2: Circulation of the World Economic Herald, 1980-1989 
 
Year Number of Pages Average Circulation 
Per Issue 
Annual 
Circulation 
1980 8 N/A N/A 
1981 8 N/A 3,685,618 
1982 12 89,000 4,959,000 
1983 12 264,900 13,774,800 
1984 12 303,500 15,138,800 
1985 12 196,700 10,100,000 
1986 16 142,000 7,265,000 
1987 16 170,000 8,840,000 
1988 16 185,600 9,460,000 
1989 16 164,000 2,952,000 
Source: Zhongguo xinwen nianjian [China Journalism Yearbook], Research Institute of 
Journalism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, comp., (Beijing: Chinese Social 
Sciences Publishing House), 1982-1989 
 
TABLE 3.3: Number of Issues of the World Economic Herald Published Each 
Year: 
 
Year Starting Issue Number Ending Issue Number Total Number of Issues 
1980 1 13 13 
1981 14 65 52 
1982 66 116 51 
1983 117 167 51 
1984 168 219 52 
1985 220 270 51 
1986 271 321 51 
1987 322 372 51 
1988 373 423 51 
1989 424 441 18 
Source: Zhongguo xinwen nianjian [China Journalism Yearbook], Research Institute of 
Journalism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, comp., (Beijing: Chinese Social 
Sciences Publishing House), 1982-1989 
 
Format and Content 
     As stated earlier, the Herald was a bi-weekly newspaper when it was 
founded in 1980, and changed to weekly since 1981.  During its 9 years of 
publication, the Herald expanded its page numbers from 8 to 12, and later to 
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16, in correspondence to the circulation increase.  The Herald distinguished 
itself in many ways, both in format and content.  Compared with many other 
Chinese newspapers at that time, the Herald had a unique page layout.  
Adopting the format and styles of Western newspapers, the Herald had an 
English title in the “New York Times” font, and the first page looked like a 
show window that used bold headlines to list the outlines of every major topic 
discussed in the paper.  These headlines were often inspirational and forceful, 
and more importantly, eye-catching.  For example, headlines included “A 
Corrupt Government Will Only Eat Its Own Bitter Fruit,” “Political Reform Is 
the Guarantee for the Success of Economic Reform,” “Economic 
Democratization Will Lead To Political Democratization.”  In words of Qian 
Junrui, “the Herald has created its own distinctive style which should have 
existed a long time ago in Chinese journalism, and the Herald has set a good 
example for other newspapers to follow.”61
 
 
     As its title suggests, the Herald was a newspaper about economics. The 
paper’s content is comprehensive, mainly providing world and domestic 
economic news, commenting about current economic situations and issues in 
China, popularizing economic knowledge, introducing new economic 
development and economic management both at home and abroad, and 
exchanging research results concerning both the national economy and the 
                                                        
61 Qian Junrui, To Explore, 5. 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, Unpublished PhD thesis, 1991 
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world economic situation.  Meanwhile, the paper paid lots of attentions to 
economic theories and principles.  The paper had a special section named 
“Self-Study University,” which systematically presented lectures on 
economics.  This column attracted a large number of readers who were 
interested in economics.  
When it started in 1980, the paper focused primarily on economic issues 
particularly the world economy.  But as time went by, the paper not only 
shifted its focus to the domestic economy—both the current situation and 
developmental prospects--but also placed heavy coverage on political reforms.  
     Different from other newspapers, the Herald was distinct in its reporting 
coverage.  During its 9 years of existence, the Herald strove to present a 
distinct and true voice to the Chinese people.  The paper tried to provide 
solid information filled with facts and substance rather than vague and general 
views or opinions.  Its underlying philosophy was to “let the facts speak for 
themselves.”  For example, the Herald spent large coverage on economic 
activities in the Soviet Union, some Eastern European countries, and Taiwan, 
subjects that most other Chinese newspapers chose to neglect.  Instead of 
biased coverage, the Herald tried to reflect the economic reality in those 
countries or regions with facts, especially about Taiwan.  Before the 1980s, 
most of the newspapers in mainland China either played down the economic 
reality in Taiwan or paid little attention to the economic situation in Taiwan.  
In order to help the general public on mainland China to gain the correct 
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image and have a better understanding of situations in Taiwan, the Herald 
published lots of articles about Taiwan such as “Characteristics of Taiwan’s 
Economy.” “Life of the People in Taiwan” “Taiwan’s Economic Importance in 
Global Market” and “The Development of Taiwan’s Economy: History and 
Prospect.”   
On domestic issues, the Herald’s reporting was always bold and 
insightful.  For instance, in 1981, the Party and the central government 
launched the anti-spiritual contamination campaign.  In response to this, most 
newspapers avoided mentioning learning contemporary Western economic 
theories.  Yet, the Herald published an article saying that it is very important 
and helpful to study Western economic theories in order to promote the 
modernization of China62
                                                        
62 Qian Jurui, To Explore, 14. 
  Doing this well without retribution was due to the 
Herald’s strong “back mountains”, as well as Herald’s successful ping-pong 
strategy of “hitting line balls” (cha bian qiu) that kept the support and 
protection of reformers in the ruling group of the CCP.  As Qin explained 
later, the borderline strategy meant: “the Herald adheres to the principles of 
reforms and open policy, to push our reports to the maximum limitation of (the 
CCP’s) tolerance and reduce risk to the minimum.  At the same time, catch 
any opportunity to break through unreasonable limitation upon the freedom of 
the press, thus quickly expanding the scope and the depth of reports.  
Sometimes we seem to play the ball away from the border, but at least we 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, Unpublished PhD thesis, 1991 
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survive.”63
Noteworthy to mention is that the news items published by the Herald 
were always exclusive.  Because the paper did not want to follow the 
mainstream, it avoided publishing any news or articles published by other 
major Chinese newspapers.  It tried to avoid using economic news released 
by the official Xinhua News Agency upon which the majority of Chinese 
newspapers were heavily dependent.  Editors of the Herald made full use of 
news and stories supplied by foreign news agencies, as well as foreign 
newspapers or magazines and reports presented by authoritative economic 
organizations or institutions.  The Herald established its own sources so as to 
guarantee the exclusiveness of its content.  For example, the Herald reached 
an agreement with the Xinhua News Agency that all Xinhua foreign 
correspondents would be special correspondent of the World Economic 
Herald.     
 
In addition, the Herald was active in organizing and sponsoring talks 
and conferences in various cities, such as Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangzhou, 
Tianjin, and many others.  Some of these conferences were even televised 
nationwide.64  Most other newspapers, however, only organized conferences 
in their own cities.65
                                                        
63 See SJJJDB, February 27, 1989, 3.  
 Moreover, it often interviewed famous figures.  Since 
interview reporting had seldom been used in the Chinese press before the 
64 Wright, “The political fortunes”, 351. 
65 Wright, “The political fortunes”, 351. 
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1980s, 66
 
 the interviews featured in the Herald certainly caught people’s 
attentions.  Overseas interviewees were often scholars and government 
officials, such as Milton Friedman, Alvin Toffler, and Samuel Huntington, 
Michel Oksenburg, Harry Harding, Li Zhengdao, and ambassadors from many 
countries including the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Australia.  
     As a result, the Herald provided more in-depth and exclusive 
information than other major Chinese newspapers.  It also often approached 
big economic issues faster and provided more timely information than others.  
Most importantly, the Herald attempted to approach an issue from all aspects, 
presenting both positive and negative views, background information, 
explanations and comparative materials. In the words of Lu Ping, deputy 
editor-in-chief of the Herald, “our report must be in depth and profound and 
give the reader all dimensions of the issues.”67
  
  Its news and issue reports 
have been called by readers “holographic coverage.” As Table 3.4 shows, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
66 Wright, “The political fortunes”, 353. 
67 Meirong Yang, “The Case of the World Economic Herald”, 186. 
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Table 3.4: The Herald and Other Major Newspapers In Terms of Timing 
Report 
 
Issues Discussed Date of Herald’s 
Stories on the 
Issue 
Date of other 
major newspaper’s 
stories on the issue 
Basic Economic Structure January 13, 1981 January 26, 1981  
(People’s Daily) 
Handling the relation between 
adjustment and reforms 
February, 2, 1981 March 13, 1981 
(Worker’s Daily) 
Speed of economic development 
in adjustment and reforms 
September 7, 1981 A month or more 
late in other major 
newspapers 
Source: this information is taken from Hua Ni, World Economic Herald: a case study 
of economic newspapers in China. 
 
Having realized the Herald’s influence and significance to the nation, the 
government also used the newspaper to test the practicality of its new 
policies.68  Government officials usually liked to leak information concerning 
new policies through the Herald to the general public and detect the public 
response before they officially implemented the new policies.69
 
  The Herald 
became the window for the authorities to watch for the suitable atmosphere to 
introduce either political or economic changes.  
     As pointed out earlier, the Herald was aimed at promoting reform in 
China.  The Herald was especially valuable when it deviated boldly from the 
CCP’s tradition.  Since the establishment of PRC, the CCP had never allowed 
an independent voice to exist.  Therefore, a crucial question arises: how 
                                                        
68 Chang, Mass Media, 128. 
69 Chang, Mass Media, 128. 
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could the Herald survive under the rule of the CCP for nine years?  One 
essential reason for this was that the Herald was running in the waves of 
economic reform in the 1980s.  As an economic newspaper, the Herald was 
helpful in pushing and enlarging these reforms.   Especially in its early years, 
the Herald thoroughly reported the country’s economic activities under the 
guidance of the Party. It paid tremendous attention to Party policies and 
provided large amount of spaces to news about economic reforms.  As a 
result, the Herald survived under the rule of the CCP and gained recognition 
from the Chinese people.  Yet, the Herald also evolved into a leading 
dissident newspaper, the next important subject for discussion.  
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Chapter IV.  The Evolution of the Herald: 1980-1900 
     The circulation of the World Economic Herald grew rapidly after it was 
founded in 1980.  It increased from 89,000 copies per week in 1982 to 
264,900 copies in 1983 and to 303,500 copies in 1984, the peak of its 
circulation.  From 1985 onwards, the circulation of the Herald decreased 
slightly..  To understand these changes in circulation, it is necessary to 
examine the changes of the Herald’s content over the years.  As both Lucian 
Pye and Chin-Chuan Lee have observed, China’s mass media not only voiced 
official slogans but “occasionally acted as a forum for advocating policy 
changes and alternatives.”70
 
  This was also true for the Herald.  The changes 
of content over time reflect a change of political climate in China but also the 
changing of values of political elites, government officials, and journalists.  
The evolution of the Herald can be divided into two major periods: 1980 to 
1985, and 1986 to 1989.  The first period was economics oriented, while the 
latter was more politically oriented. 
 
The World Economic Herald: 1980-1985 
 
     From 1980 to 1985, the Herald focused primarily on economic issues, 
both domestic and foreign.  Starting in June 1980, the Herald initially chose 
to place its reporting focus on the world economy.  It not only reported the 
situation and developmental experiences of developed Western countries, such 
as the U.S., Western Europe, Australia and Japan; it also gave a lot of coverage 
                                                        
70 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China,7. 
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to less developed countries, such as the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and 
India.  This choice of reporting on the world economy was made by the 
Herald intentionally.  According to the Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli, this was 
due to: 1) the difficulty in reporting on the domestic economy in China at that 
time; and 2) the need to introduce Western experiences to support and push 
forward economic reforms in China.  However, from 1981 onwards, the 
Herald gradually shifted its reporting focus from foreign to domestic issues.  
As the table below shows:  
 
TABLE 4.1. Content of the World Economic Herald (Items) 
 
Year International 
News 
Domestic News Other Total 
1980 268 110 72 454 
1981 711 397 254 1397 
1982 728 528 163 1712 
1983 640 751 148 1880 
1984 568 885 134 1818 
1985 774 947 146 1944 
1986 851 1201 196 2358 
1987 870 1079 198 2223 
1988 661 959 227 1873 
1989 123 189 21 339 
Source：Shijie jingji daobao:1980-1989 [The World Economic Herald: 1980-1989], in 
microfilm. Shanghai: Zhongguo shijie jingji xuehui [China Society of World 
Economics]: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yanjiusuo [World Economics 
Institute of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], 
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Graph 4.1 The Herald’s Changing Reporting Interest: 1980-1989 
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Source：Shijie jingji daobao:1980-1989 [The World Economic Herald: 1980-1989], in 
microfilm. Shanghai: Zhongguo shijie jingji xuehui [China Society of World 
Economics]: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yanjiusuo [World Economics 
Institute of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], 
 
Apparently, starting at 110 items in 1980, the Herald’s reporting coverage on 
domestic news increased year by year and reached its peak in 1986, 1987 and 
1988.  The paper’s reporting on international news, in contrast, had no stable 
trend; it fluctuated over the years.  Yet one thing is clear: the paper’s 
reporting on domestic issues outnumbered international issues after 1983.  
    The editors of the Herald held a firm goal since the beginning of the 
paper: to present a unique and distinct voice to the readers.  Due to this, the 
Herald maintained a bold and critical voice in its reporting throughout its nine 
years of existence.  It always pointed out the inadequacies of China’s reform 
projects.  In the founding year of 1980, the Herald focused primarily on the 
modernization of China and the new directions of China’s economic 
development.  From June 1980 to 1981, the Herald gave considerable 
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coverage to how to understand the special conditions of China.  In order to 
help readers to understand the government’s modernization project, the Herald 
allocated much space to explaining what modernization is, and more 
importantly, “What is the Chinese Style of Modernization.”71  In particular, 
the paper gave large coverage to Zhao Ziyang’s talk on the construction of the 
Chinese style modernization. 72  Consistent with Zhao’s talk, the Herald 
claimed that China’s modernization project needed to be based on China’s 
local situation, i.e., it needed to take domestic conditions into consideration.  
“China’s economic development needs to take issues of social development, 
economy, and international environment into consideration.”73  To elaborate 
on this, the Herald used the failure of the “Self-Strengthening Movement” as 
an example, informing its Chinese readership that it would be impossible for 
China to depend on buying advanced foreign practices and goods as the sole 
means of national development.74
     Through reporting in this manner, the Herald successfully distinguished 
itself from other government-controlled newspapers.  It successfully 
presented a fresh and distinct voice.  The distinctive voice of the Herald can 
be illustrated by the headlines on the front page.  For example, in regarding 
  The economic policies of the government 
needed to be based on reality, not on idealism.  Only by doing this could the 
government avoid further mistakes and achieve success.  
                                                        
71 See SJJJDB, June 20, 1980. 
72 See SJJJDB, September 30, 1980. 
73 See SJJJDB, September 20, 1980 
74 See SJJJDB, August 15, 1980. 1. 
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China’s modernization, on July 15, 1980, the following headline was written: 
“No Single Country’s Modernization Is Attained by Copying from Others.” 
August 15, 1980: “China’s Modernization Needs to Consider Domestic 
Situations”. October 30, 1980: “We May Need Some Capitalism: We Cannot 
Allow To Die Now”, “Employees May Invest and Buy Stocks of the 
Enterprises”, etc.  Also, the Herald initiated discussion of how to use 
capitalism to serve China’s economic reforms, enhanced its reputation and 
earned support among reformers and students.  As an editor said: “the Herald 
wanted the Chinese people to know the real situation in China, and further, to 
make the party more realistic and flexible.”75
     In addition, the timely reports of the Herald and insightful articles it 
presented helped to gain it support.   In 1980, the most important events 
were two conferences: one was a forum of Chinese and Japanese economists 
held in Beijing in August, and the other was a forum about economy and 
technology circle of the capital that was held in Hong Kong in October.  Both 
were very important to China at that time.  In reporting the two events, the 
Herald used the titles “China’s Modernization Construction Should Fit China’s 
Very Conditions”
     
76
                                                        
75 Meirong Yang, “The Case of the World Economic Herald,” 186. 
. And “Getting Well by Understanding the Conditions of 
the Country, to Solve the Problems of Development and Strategy.”  The 
Herald’s detailed reporting and high quality comments and analysis greatly 
attracted and impressed readers.  
76 See SJJJDB, March 9, 1981, 1. 
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It is easy to see that the year 1980 was a key foundation year.  
Although the editors of the paper shared a firm belief about presenting a 
unique voice, they did not have a clear goal for the paper’s long-term 
development.  Regardless, the Herald with its unique brand of reporting and 
insightful articles won the support of readers as well as from government 
officials.  Its powerful “back mountains” further helped the development of 
the paper. This initial success in turn increased the Herald’s confidence about 
its reporting, and this consequently helped and influenced the editors to reach 
decisions about the long-term goals for the paper.  By realizing the 
importance of government support, editors at the Herald decided to stick more 
closely to the government reform policies.  As a result, beginning from 1981, 
the Herald gradually shifted its focus to the domestic economy.   Meanwhile, 
in order to increase the professional quality of the paper, the Herald allocated 
more coverage on economic theories.  In response to readers’ demands, in the 
late 1980s, the Herald opened a special section called “Self-Study University” 
to give lectures on economic theories and principles.   
     In 1981, the big focus in China was on the State Economy Adjustment 
Program, which the Herald reported heavily on.  Launched by the Chinese 
reformers, the adjustment program was basically about how to change the 
CCP’s old economic system of central planning to a new market-oriented one.  
The Herald spent large amounts of news, information, and comments to 
explain the importance of the adjustment programs and how much progress 
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had been actually achieved since the beginning of the reforms.  Although 
speaking in favor of the government, the Herald never dared to point out 
problems and/or inadequacies of government policies.  As the 
Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli stated: “the paper’s editorial policy was not only to 
point out problems in the economy reform, but also to stress they were the past. 
And the important thing is to point out the country has great prospect for 
future development, and hence to ask people to become involved in the 
reforms.”77
     In 1982, the Herald’s focus had already shifted its attention to China’s 
domestic economy.  The Herald now began to place more stress on in-depth 
analysis and interpretations of China’s economic changes rather than merely 
reporting the daily news.  Beginning in 1982, as the economic reforms 
gaining strength, the need to enter the international market became apparent.  
The Chinese government began actively to promote “special economic zones.”  
Sticking closely to the government’s moves, the Herald gave heavy coverage 
to the introduction of “special economic zones”. The Herald sent staff 
  Reporting such as this greatly helped the Chinese people to 
understand the current situation.  The paper’s opinions, therefore, played an 
active role in the transition of the Chinese economic order from a restricted, 
centrally planned economy to a partly price-oriented market economy.  The 
Herald helped the Chinese people acquire a stronger capacity of tolerance 
during this transition. 
                                                        
77 Zhang Weiguo, Qin Benli de cha bian qiu, 102. 
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members to Shanghai, Beijing, Fuzhou, Wuhan, Tianjin, Dalian, and Shenyang 
- eight big port cities in China - to interview city leaders and famous 
economists. The goal was to foster discussion about access to the international 
market and to make China’s economy more connected to the international 
economy.  The staff of the Herald tried hard to foster a strong basis for 
China’s further reforms and, more importantly, to get more Party and 
government officials involved in these reforms.   
     By 1983, with the success of reforms in rural areas, economic reform in 
China moved to the second stage -- urban economic reform.  China’s urban 
economic reforms were primarily about the shift from direct to indirect 
regulation, from micro to macro control, and from a product economy to a 
planned commodity economy.   Noteworthy of mentioning is that a market 
economy had already begun to develop in China at that time.  In response to 
this, the Herald devoted one fourth of its pages to cover news and discussions, 
about the transition of reforms.  For example, headlines included: “The 
Future of China Belongs to Reformers,” “The Reforms Represent the Basic 
Interests of One Billion People,” “The Old Ideas and Concepts Must be 
Changed and Reformed”, etc.   In addition, the Herald sent its journalists to 
many provinces, cities, and autonomous regions to investigate and report.  In 
an editorial, “The Reforms Represent the Basic Interests of One Billion 
People,” the Herald argued that the old equalitarianism structure of “Big 
Boiler Rice” and “Iron Bowl” should be reconsidered and questioned strongly.  
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The “Iron Bowl” made people lazy and the “Big Boiler Rice” made the state 
poor.  The Herald’s reporting provoked strong reactions in Chinese society.  
Intellectuals, students, and government officials were all actively engaged in 
discussing the reforms.   In this sense, the paper played a very important and 
active role in urging people and government officials to take part in the 
reforms.   
 
     As the above discussions suggest, during the years from 1980 to 1984, 
the Herald and its editors basically stuck to the subject of economic reform, 
acting as the mouthpiece of the reformers in the CCP.  It tried to influence the 
Party’s policy-making, and in fact it did.  The Herald with its unique 
reporting gained support from readers and, more importantly, from reformers 
in the CCP.  Premier Zhao Zhiyang, head of the central propaganda 
department Zhu Houzhe and many other reformers in the CCP were strong 
backers.  Due to this, the Herald never hesitated to publish, Deng Xiaoping’s 
reform ideas and, sometimes, to give liberal explanations of Deng’s ideas.  
The support from reform-minded leaders undoubtedly granted the Herald  
unusual freedom in its reporting.  Noteworthy to mention the fact is that 
during late 1983, conservatives in the CCP launched the “Anti-Spiritual 
Pollution Campaign,” in which many newspapers underwent strict 
examinations by the government.  Similar to others, the Herald was criticized 
for violating the personnel system by employing staff without considering 
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their political files; the staff member was also criticized for taking too many 
business trips.  However, these charges were not pursued seriously and only 
represented a mild rebuke.   The campaign did not influence the Herald as 
much as it did other newspapers.  The Herald did not have to change the 
direction of its editorial policy, and the circulation of the paper still had 
continuous growth.  In fact, both 1983 and 1984 were the years that the 
Herald achieved its highest circulation, have with 1984 becoming the peak of 
the Herald’s circulation (15,138,800 copies).    
     In June 1985, in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the funding 
of the Herald, many newspapers including the Party organ People’s Daily, 
Guangming Daily, Wenhui Daily, China News Agency, Central T.V. Station, 
Central People’s Broadcasting Station, New China’s Agency, Hong Kong 
Economic Herald, and almost all major medias in Shanghai wrote 
congratulation letters to the Herald.  For example, People’s Daily wrote a 
message praising the Herald: 
You have made great achievements in the past five years.  Being 
prompted by the mission of the time, you have tried every means 
possible and have done your utmost in exploring the road which would 
lead China to economic prosperity.  You have demonstrated your 
global perspective, high strategy, and incisive views with a lively style 
and distinctive characteristic in your coverage and content. You’ve 
developed a school of your own in Chinese journalism. You spare no 
efforts in advocating reforms, and you have offered good ideas and 
opinions for the modernization of our nation…you are a good teacher 
for your counterparts and a helpful friend of readers. You are worthy of 
the name of the Herald.78
                                                        
78 “Laizi renmin ribao de yifengxin” [A message from Renmin Ribao], SJJJDB June 
20, 1985,1.  
 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
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In addition to newspapers and media, there were many government officials 
and scholars who also congratulated the Herald.  Hu Jiwei, former standing 
member of the People’s Assembly and former chief editor of People’s Daily, 
wrote to the Herald: 
You stand in the front of the economic reform, advocating, pushing and 
influencing it…you opened a window to let people know the world and 
make the reforms needed to perform on the stage of the world; your 
paper is carefully edited and, by developing its quality, attracts more 
and more readers; you have people committed to truth but not to 
employment as members of your strong staff board; you did not apply 
for government subsidies, did not contend for governmental 
establishment (rank), did not try to become an “organ paper” of the CCP 
or administrative structure, not kept a massive circulation on public 
expense; you have focused on how to serve readers and the reforms in 
China…”79
 
 
As the above discussion suggested, the Herald was actually not 
established as a dissident newspaper.  It was founded in 1980 as an economy 
newspaper for reporting world economy news.  However, as the newspaper 
gained support and consolidated itself, the editors of the paper developed a 
clearer aim and position for the newspaper.  Under the liberal-minded 
leadership of Qin Benli, and the support from reform-minded government 
officials, the Herald gradually changed its goal to the one that aimed to help 
with the Chinese government’s reforms, and more importantly, to push the 
reforms forward.  This can be illustrated by the Herald’s shift of focus from 
reporting world economy to domestic economy.   
In the first five years of its publication, the Herald’s reporting basically 
                                                        
79 “Hujiwei zhi Qinbenli de yifengxin” [A Letter from Hu Jiwei to Qin Benli], 
SJJJDB, June 1985. 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
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stayed within the Party line, despite its critical voice.  Indeed, the Herald 
actively propagated government reform policies.  However, as pointed out 
earlier, the Herald was closed down by the Chinese government in May 1989 
because of its dissident voice.  Hence if we consider the Herald as a dissident 
newspaper, we should make it clear that we are talking about the Herald after 
1985.  The crucial questions that need to be answered are: why did the 
Herald deviate from the Party lines? What caused this deviation? How did this 
dissident voice evolve over time? 
 
 
The World Economic Herald: 1985-1989 
 
     Different from the first stage of the Herald (1980-1985), the second 
stage of the Herald (1985-1989) was more politically-oriented.  From the 
latter half of 1983 onwards, non-economic related articles began to appear in 
the Herald.  By early 1985, the Herald started to report news of the positive 
effects of economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union and some 
Eastern European countries.  For example, the issue of March 18, 1985 
carried a news story entitled “Through Several Twists and Turns, the Eastern 
European Countries Recognize the Positive Effects of Private Economy.”  In 
this report, the Herald explained how Eastern Germany changed its economic 
system to a private one, how the Polish Government let peasants trade their 
lands, and how did Yugosovia developed a private economy.  These were 
three former Communist countries.  
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     The tendency towards political orientation became more and more 
obvious from 1986 onwards.  Beginning in 1986, the issues of political 
reform were widely discussed in China.  Due to various problems caused by 
the economic reforms, the Chinese people’s voice for political change 
increased greatly.  In response to this, the Herald gave heavy coverage to 
discussions of political reform.  Over the years between 1986 and 1989, 
themes relating to political reform occupied almost the entire paper.  Some 
people even accused the Herald of switching from an “economic herald” to a 
“political herald” and of being responsible for the student democracy 
movement of late 1986 and early 1987 by advocating “bourgeois liberalism.”80
Sooner or later, China will take the road of political reform.  We in the 
newspaper business are like roosters heralding the break of the day.  If 
we crow late, people will say we are lazy.  If the crowing is earlier, we 
will wake people from sleep at night and they will be disgusted with us.  
Our heralding must be exactly at the break of the day.
  
In responding to such charges, Qin Benli said: 
81
The heavy coverage of political reforms inevitably led to discussions of 
democracy and freedom, leading the Herald toward a higher level of deviation 
from the Party line.  However, in order to get a clearer picture of the change 
of the Herald’s direction, it is necessary to take the overall environment of 
Chinese society at that time into consideration.  
 
 
 
The Problems of Reforms 
 
                                                        
80 Zhang Weiguo, Qin Benli de cha bian qiu, 67. 
81 Zhang Weiguo, Qin Benli de cha bian qiu, 68 
Also see, Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991. 
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The economic reforms in early 1980s caused many problems, and these 
problems started to emerge and became intense in the mid-1980s.  First of all, 
the success of the economic reforms in the rural areas caused serious 
economic imbalances.  Peasants, especially those near the cities and towns; 
now became richer than the manufacturing workers.  Workers’ dissatisfaction 
with the reforms hence increased.  Realizing the importance and need for 
reform in the cities, the Chinese government decided to introduce reforms into 
the manufacturing sector, in other words, among workers.  However, in 
practice, these reforms were not as easy as they had been for peasant farmers.  
They conflicted with the worker’s established interests.  They also created an 
even more over-heated economy.   
Meanwhile, the imbalance and conflict between constructional demand 
and resource supply posed another threat.  The country’s limited resources 
could not meet the demands made by China’s high speed of economic 
development.  On the one hand, the Chinese government was active in 
constructing new projects; on the other hand, resources such as capital, raw 
materials, and transportation were limited and could not catch up.   This 
resulted in the situation of serious inflation.  Prices in the cities began to rise, 
while people’s working wage remained unchanged.  
     In addition, enterprise reforms encountered severe problems as well.  
Originally, the goal for the government was to reform the enterprises by 
introducing a competitive mechanism; by doing so, the enterprises would 
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develop positively through competition.  However, the actual results turned 
out badly.  Many enterprises spent most of their operational funds on welfare 
and bonuses rather than reproduction; some even monopolized production of 
heavily demanded commodities so as to engage in speculation.   
Moreover, the price reforms created further chaos.  Price reforms 
created strong inflation and imbalances between supply and demand. As the 
Chinese government decided to increase the price of commodities, people’s 
wages lagged behind and consequently contributed to the failure of the price 
reforms.  The Chinese government, afraid that the unemployment rate would 
get worse, showed reluctance to reform its labor and employment system 
which were characterized by overstaffing, unwieldiness, low efficiency, and 
“eating from the same big pot”.   The failure of the price reform, however, 
could be viewed as a result of failure of reforms in other sectors such as the 
lack of necessary independent enterprises, market regulations, entrepreneurs, 
and relevant laws.    
Furthermore, inside the Party corruption became very prevalent in China 
at the time, to the point of becoming a serious threat to the reforms.  
Although official corruption was not something new, it became rampant 
during the urban economic reform.  As Jiang Zemin, the former Party 
General Secretary in China said: “serious corruption among the Party cadres 
and leaders was an important factor” responsible for the 1989 pro-democracy 
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student movement in China.82
In was in this big historical context that the Herald changed its editorial 
direction.  The editors of the Herald clearly recognized that without a 
substantial political reform, the economic reforms could not progress further.  
As a result, the Herald became more politically active; it reported more on 
political than economic issues, and its voice became increasingly critical.   
 To sum up, the slow pace of political reform 
was a major obstacle to further economic change. The introduction of a market 
mechanism created a situation in which the old political system and the new 
economic system coexisted and mingled.  This in turn created problems of 
chaos and imbalance for the reforms.  Increased problems of inflation and 
corruption, in turn, stimulated the Chinese people’s desire for further political 
changes.  
 
Personnel Change 
     In addition to the changing political climate of the mid-1980s, a newly 
appointed editorial board was another important factor in contributing the 
Herald’s change of editorial policies.  The year 1985 is a marked turning 
point for the Herald.  The paper had significant personnel changes after 1985.  
From 1985 onwards, many founding editors retired, leaving only Qin Benli 
and young people who joined the paper.  By 1989, the average age of the 
Herald’s editorial board dropped to 38, which is in great contrast to the 
                                                        
82. Xu Yu, The press, and social change, 1991 
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average age of 63 – in 1980 when the Herald was founded.83
 
  Compared to 
previous editorial board members who were well-known scholars and/or 
renown public figures, most of the new editorial board members were 
unknowned recent college graduates.  As Table 4.2 below shows, most of 
them had university educations and, more importantly; many of them had 
formal journalism training.  Given the fact that the Western journalism 
influences were prominent in China in the 1980s, it is not hard to see that these 
young people had been heavily influenced by Western ideas of press freedom 
and, as a result, were bolder and radical in their political activities, especially 
compared with their predecessors in the Herald.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
83 See SJJJDB, February 27, 1989. 
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TABLE 4.2.: Board of Editors of the World Economic Herald (1988) 
 
Name Educational Background Position in the 
Paper 
Qin Benli Chaoyang College, Beijing Editor-in-Chief 
Zhu Xingqing High School Education Deputy 
Editor-in-Chief 
Fan Jun College education  Deputy 
Editor-in-Chief 
Chen Lebo Fudan University Head of Chinese 
Economic News 
Dept 
Lu Yi College education Head of Front-Page 
News Dept 
Chen Hongbing Fudan University, Journalism Head of Theoretical 
Affairs Dept 
Zhang Weiguo East China Institute of Political 
Science & Law 
Head of Beijing 
Bureau 
Xu Xiaowei College education Head of Guangzhou 
Bureau  
Shen Feihao College education Editor 
Ruan Jiangning People’s University, Journalism Editor 
Chen Danhong Fudan University, Journalism Editor 
He Ling College education  Editor  
Source: Li Cheng and Lynn T. White III, "China's technocratic movement and the 
World Economic Herald," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3  
 
As discussed in the earlier chapters, these young journalists, under the 
influence of Western ideas of freedom and democracy, contributed greatly to 
the Herald’s changing directions.  In addition, the Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli 
played a crucial role in the Herald’s change of direction.   Qin wanted to 
push forward with China’s reforms.  The reasons for change of the Herald’s 
reporting focus, therefore, can be summarized as due to: growing 
dissatisfaction towards the economic reforms; increased demand for political 
changes; the relative freedom the Chinese society enjoyed in the 1980s after a 
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series of reforms; Western influences; and last but the most important, the 
reform and liberal-minded leadership of Qin Benli.  
Soon after the new editorial direction was determined, the Herald 
moved to play a new role in China’s reforms.  From then on, the Herald 
actively and explicitly called for political and economic changes, often 
admittedly from a “liberal” rather than “radical” perspective. The Herald now 
became the one publication that really represented the Chinese people and 
intellectuals, while at same time giving support to the reformers in the CCP.  
The new goal for the Herald was to bring the pressure of public opinion upon 
the CCP and to wake the desires of the Chinese people for freedom and 
democracy.  
 
 
Content of the Herald: 1985-1989 
 
General Trend 
 
     Starting from 1985 onwards, the Herald’s reporting on political issues 
significantly increased.  Table 4.3 below traces the number of articles relating 
to political issues in the Herald from 1980 to 1989.  It shows that the Herald 
expanded its coverage on political issues during its nine year of publication.  
 
 
 
 
 58 
Table 4.3. Yearly Distribution of Articles Relating to Political Affairs 
 
Year Number of Articles Percent of Total 
1980 0 0.0% 
1981 2 0.3% 
1982 11 1.8% 
1983 14 2.3% 
1984 15 2.5% 
1985 18 3.0% 
1986 112 18.7% 
1987 58 9.6% 
1988 227 37.9% 
1989 141 23.5% 
Total 598 100.0% 
Source：Shijie jingji daobao:1980-1989 [The World Economic Herald: 1980-1989], in 
microfilm. Shanghai: Zhongguo shijie jingji xuehui [China Society of World 
Economics]: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yanjiusuo [World Economics 
Institute of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], 
 
As the table above indicates, the Herald at its beginning (1980) had no interest 
in political issues.  And during its first stage of life (1981-1985), the Herald’s 
interest in political issues was very limited - there were only about 60 articles 
related to political issues during these five years, which accounted for 10 
percent of the total number of articles.  Yet, the situation changed drastically 
after 1985.  From 1985 onwards, the articles on political reforms increased 
significantly.  Indeed, 1986 saw the first peak of the Herald’s reporting on 
political issues--about 112 articles on politics published in the year, which is 
about two times of the number of articles in its previous five years.   In 1987, 
while the Herald’s reporting on politics had a continuous growth, it decreased 
slightly compared to 1986; still, it outnumbered the total number of the 
paper’s articles reported in its first five years.  1988 was another peak of the 
Herald’s bold reporting.  The reporting on political issues increased again in 
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1988; there were about 223 articles in total on political issues, which 
accounted for 37.9 percent of the total number of articles. And this trend of 
growth continued in 1989 until the end of the paper.  As we already know, 
the Herald was closed down by the Chinese government in May, 1989. But 
even for the first five months of 1989, the Herald had a total number of 141 
articles on political subjects, which even exceeded the years of 1986 and 1987.   
To sum up, the Herald’s coverage of political issues had a continuous increase 
between the years 1986 and 1989, particularly the years 1986, 1988 and 1989, 
in which the number of articles accounted for 80.2 percent of the total number 
of articles published during the nine year period.     
     In order to get a clearer idea of how dissident the Herald was, it is 
necessary to examine the types of political issues the Herald reported.   
Table 4.4 below shows the number of different categories of content the 
Herald dealt with each year: 
 
TABLE 4.4. Number of Different Categories of Political Issues Dealt with 
Each Year 
 
Year Number of Categories  
1980 0 
1981 2 
1982 5 
1983 5 
1984 8 
1985 9 
1986 20 
1987 14 
1988 30 
1989 32 
Source：Shijie jingji daobao:1980-1989 [The World Economic Herald: 1980-1989], in 
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microfilm. Shanghai: Zhongguo shijie jingji xuehui [China Society of World 
Economics]: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yanjiusuo [World Economics 
Institute of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], 
 
The findings, in correspondence to the general trend as discussed earlier, show 
that the Herald’s reporting categories increased year by year.  One apparent 
trend is that the Herald expanded its coverage of issues relating to China’s 
political reforms from 1985 onwards.  It had a great increase during the years 
from 1986 to 1989; particularly the years 1988 and 1989 witnessed the highest 
reported by the Herald--30 out of a total of 35 categories.  Yet, 1987 was a 
downturn for the Herald, which only had 14 categories in the year.  The ups 
and downs of the Herald’s political reporting can be explained by the interplay 
between the Herald’s political activism and the changing political climate in 
China. 
Table 4.5 presents a detailed outlook of the focus of the Herald’s 
reporting: 
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TABLE 4.5 Categories of the Herald’s Political Reporting: 1980-1989 
 
Category Cumulative 
Number 
Percent of 
Total 
Integration of economic reform and 
political reform 
121 20.2% 
Rule by Law 53 8.8% 
Democratization 58 9.6% 
Press freedom 47 7.8% 
Openness 42 7.0% 
Four cardinal principles 30 5.0% 
Institutionalization 26 4.3% 
Relations between press and political 
reforms 
25 4.1% 
Decentralization of power 25 4.1% 
Political corruption 22 3.6% 
Neo-authoritarianism 18 3.0% 
Constitution 16 2.6% 
Bureaucracy 15 2.5% 
Modernization of leadership 14 2.3% 
Differentiation of Party and 
Government  
13 2.1% 
Pluralism 10 1.6% 
Popular participation in politics 9 1.5% 
Multi-party system 9 1.5% 
Transparency 8 1.3% 
Economic determinism 8 1.3% 
Election 8 1.3% 
Human rights 8 1.3% 
Censorship 2 0.3% 
Propaganda 2 0.3% 
Class struggle 2 0.3% 
Press autonomy 1 0.1% 
Others 6 0.1% 
Total 598 100.0% 
Source：Shijie jingji daobao:1980-1989 [The World Economic Herald: 1980-1989], in 
microfilm. Shanghai: Zhongguo shijie jingji xuehui [China Society of World 
Economics]: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yanjiusuo [World Economics 
Institute of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], 
 
As the findings indicate, the Herald was interested most in topics of 
integration, rule of law, democracy, and openness of the government.  
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Among others, integration--integration of economic and political reforms - 
was the most popular and enduring topic in the Herald.  During the nine 
years of publication, articles related to integration were 121, which accounted 
for 20.2 percent of the total.  In addition, the Herald was also actively 
engaged in talking about institutionalization, decentralization of power, 
corruption, press freedom and neo- authoritarianism.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The year 1986 was important for China.  From late 1985 onwards, 
popular demand for political reforms increased continuously until 1989.   
The increased popular demand for political reform consequently promoted a 
nation-wide pro-democracy student movement later in the year.  Under the 
leadership of Editor-in-Chief Qin Benli, the Herald decided to join the 
majority--to be a voice for political reforms.  As pointed out earlier, the 
changing political climate in China had been a crucial reason in explaining 
why the Herald’s coverage in 1986 of issues relative to political change stood 
in significant contrast to 1985.  As two former Herald staff members noted, 
the Herald covered many issues on China’s political reform since the latter 
half of 1986 and advocated that “economic reforms would make progress only 
if political reforms were carried out.”84
Beginning in April 1986, the Herald’s reporting on political issues 
 
                                                        
84 Meirong Yang, “The Case of the World Economic Herald”, 190. 
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suddenly increased.  This trend of growth continued until the end of the paper 
in May 1989.  In 1986, the year’s focus was largely on the integration of 
economic and political reforms.  The paper also started to talk about the 
importance of democracy. In May 1986, in memorization of the May Fourth 
Movement, the Herald spent the whole month talking about the legacies of 
May Fourth Movement and, more importantly, it’s implications for China’s 
future reforms.  For example, on the issue of May 19, 1986 was entirely 
devoted to rethinking the May Fourth Movement.  Under the title “A New 
May Fourth Movement Is Emerging,” the Herald pointed out that just as what 
the May Fourth Movement intellectuals tried hard to promote—“political 
democracy, academic freedom, and economic prosperity—should be the three 
fundamental and inseparable factors for the nation’s development.”   
In the same issue, there were two important articles written by Professor 
Su Shaozhi, former dean of the CCP Central Marxism-Leninism Institute.  
One was “The Direction of Political Reform Is Democratization,” and another 
is “Study New Projects in Political Theory”.  Both articles were based on his 
visit to the former Communist country Hungary.  In the articles, Su pointed 
out that the key problem for China’s future reforms was the problem of single 
interest.  As Su wrote, single interest theory claims that in a socialist country, 
people’s interests have absolute congruity. Any other interests would be wrong 
and enemies of the people, therefore they must be suppressed.  This, however, 
hindered further reforms in these countries; China faced the same situation.  
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The Hungarian government realized this problem and had already started to 
change, which could serve as an example for the Chinese government to study.   
The two articles were important as they could be viewed as the Herald’s 
opening to public discussion of democracy.  Such a bold public discussion 
was the first to occur since the founding of the PRC in 1949.  
     On May 26, 1986, there was a piece entitled “The Reforms and the 
Development of a Political System in China” by Cheng Leibao, a journalist at 
the Herald’s Beijing branch.  In the article, Cheng said that in order to 
transform the old economic system to a new one and to further the economic 
reforms, it was necessary to reform the existing political system.  More 
importantly, the article pointed out that democracy was one crucial factor in 
balancing powers between the state and Party.  The article criticized Mao 
Zedong’s theory that democracy and centralization are contradictory.  From 
Cheng’s point, there was no philosophical or logical relationship between 
democracy and centralization.  Also in the same issue, there were several 
other articles that should be mentioned.  One is “Economic Reforms Will 
Eventually Lead To Completely Open Reforms,” in which the writer said: 
“China will inevitably open itself completely to the outside world, and this is 
not only limited to the fields of scientific technique and economic 
management…the ‘Self-Strengthening’ movement failed because the Qing 
government did not aim for complete reform, the CCP needs to learn from 
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history.”86
On June 9, 1986, the Herald brought up the reforms in Hungary again.  
The Herald pointed out that the Hungarian government was actively 
modernizing of its political structure.  It told the Chinese people that China’s 
reform also needed complete change, like Hungary’s.  On June 30, 1986, 
journalist Ruan Jiangning wrote a piece on political reforms.  In answering 
the question of “why past political reforms did not achieve success,” Ruan 
said, those reforms “never touch the fundamental structure of the political 
system.”
 Another article was entitled, “Academic Prosperity Is Dependent 
on Freedom and Democracy.”  Without freedom, it argued, there would be no 
room for scholars and intellectuals to express themselves freely and to pursue 
the truth.   
87
On August 4, 1986, the Herald allocated its front page to publish a talk 
by Wan Li, a core member of the Central Political Bureau.  Wan Li told the 
Herald, “China now needs to develop a socialist democracy; in particular it 
needs to promote the democratization of science.”
  From his point of view, the major problem was 
over-centralization of political powers.  The key for change therefore should 
be in the political system, particularly the system of checks and balance.  
Most importantly, China’s political reform needed to be practical.  
88
                                                        
86 See SJJJDB, May 26, 1986. 
 Wan also called for  
openness and transparency in governmental activities.  On August 18, the 
city mayor of Shen Zhen told the Herald, “The experimentation with political 
87 See SJJJDB,, June 30, 1986. 2. 
88 See SJJJDB,, August 4, 1986. 1. 
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reform in Shekou demonstrated that the promotion of democracy has positive 
effects on Chinese society. It has particular importance for the country’s future 
development…so we need to establish a system of democracy, and a healthy 
system of law will help achieve this”.89 On August 25, 1986, the Herald spoke 
boldly, “only after the Party achieves modernization, can it lead China to 
modernization.” 90
     The contents and views reported in the Herald were getting sharper and 
sharper.  General discussions about political reforms inevitably led to calls 
for the CCP to reform the Party itself.  Discussions of concepts of freedom 
and democracy led to calls for increased freedom and democracy by law. 
Discussions about cultural reforms led to calls for the CCP and the Chinese 
people to learn lessons from failures of the past – particularly the Cultural 
Revolution.  On September 22, 1986, the Herald published a special issue to 
discuss Mao’s Cultural Revolution from a scholarly perspective.  Under the  
title “Deep Analysis of the Ten Years of Calamity,” the Herald tried to evaluate 
the Cultural Revolution.  In regarding the issue, many experts and professors 
expressed their ideas through the Herald.  Their main points were: the basic 
factors that caused the Cultural Revolution were the lack of democratic 
systems inside the CCP; the lack of an independent legal and judicial system, 
and the lack of a strong constitutional system in China.  The Herald boldly 
 To reform the Party structure thus was the key for 
systematic political reforms.  
                                                        
89 See SJJJDB, August 18, 1986. 
90 See SJJJDB, August 25, 1986. 
 67 
claimed that without a fundamental change on the Party’s ideology, the 
Cultural Revolution would come back and happen again.  The Herald 
concluded: China will move forward positively only by eliminating rule by 
dictatorship.91
     On October 27, 1986, the Herald stated, “The whole world now is 
watching China’s political reforms, China must take some action….the 
economic democratization should be the new goal for the Chinese government 
to pursue.”
 
92
 
  Undoubtedly, the Herald was highly active in promoting social 
change in China.  The bold reporting of the Herald in the latter half of 1986 
caused a tide of liberalism to sweep through intellectuals and college students.  
Nearly all intellectuals who held different opinions from the Party line or those 
who wanted to offer creative ideas about political and economic reforms chose 
to send their articles to the Herald.  Dissidents found a place where their 
opinions could be voiced.  In this sense, the Herald successfully promoted the 
growth of dissident voices among the Chinese people.  It successfully 
aroused the Chinese people’s desire for change. 
     The year 1987 was marked a downturn in the Herald’s reporting zeal on 
political issues.  The year also was also a marked downturn by China’s 
political reforms generally.  In this year, the pro-democracy student 
movement was suppressed by conservatives in the CCP and, as a result, the 
                                                        
91 See SJJJDB, September 22, 1986, 14. 
92 See SJJJDB, October 27, 1986.1. 
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reform-minded leader Hu Yaobang was charged with encouraging the student 
movement, labeled “bourgeois liberalization.”  Hu was forced to leave his 
position as the Party’s General Secretary.  With the loss of political patronage, 
the Herald reduced its coverage of sensitive political issues.  The Herald 
switched to a lower profile in order to survive under the censorship of the 
Chinese government.  As Wright pointed out, “Qin Benli and his staff were 
adapting at gauging the political climate, lying low”.93
For example, on March 9, 1987, the Herald devoted heavy coverage to 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union.  Under the bold headline 
“The Course of the Reform is Irreversible,” the Herald introduced the current 
reforms in the Soviet Union, and by doing this, the Herald wanted to let the 
CCP know that reform could not be stopped once it started. Any efforts to stop 
the reform would be in vain.  In the same issue, another important article was 
“If We Want to Reform, A Political Reform Must Have to Be Taken.”  This 
article analyzed the progresses of reform in the Soviet Union, and pointed out 
that the fundamental problem of reform in the Soviet Union was its political 
system.  Apparently, in this year, since the discussion of political issues in 
  Hence in the year 
1987, the Herald reported more economic issues than political matters.  
Nevertheless, the paper didn’t give up its political enthusiasm.  Although in a 
relatively smaller number, the paper maintained an enthusiasm for political 
reporting throughout the year. 
                                                        
93 Kate Wright, “The political fortunes”,121. 
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China became highly sensitive and dangerous, the Herald decided to adopt the 
strategy of “stones from other hills.”  That is, by talking about political 
reforms in other countries such as the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, the 
Herald avoided talking about China directly.  But the things that happened in 
other countries served as an illustrative example for China.  By means of this 
comparison, the Herald intellectuals insinuated the problems of the former 
Communist countries, and implied their experiences could serve examples for 
China.   
On July 13, 1987, the headlines on the front page of the Herald stated: 
“political reform is the pre-requirement and guarantee of economic 
reform…now the major problem is the relationship between the Party and 
government. The core for the problems of the function of Party is the 
relationship between the Party and the state.”94  This article re-stated that the 
key problem in China was “the over-centralization of power.”  In order to 
solve this, the economy must be determined by market, since economic 
democratization will eventually cause political democratization.  In the issue 
of August 3, 1987, Sun Wei, Provincial Party Committee Secretary of 
Heilongjiang, argued “the Chinese government needs to adopt the separation 
of powers and party politics, and by doing this, it can effectively curb the 
growth of corruption.”95
On August 17, 1987, the front page of the Herald carried a piece entitled, 
  
                                                        
94 See SJJJDB, July 13, 1987.1. 
95 See SJJJDB, August 3, 1978. 8. 
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“The Communist Party Members Need Democracy As Much As They Need 
Air to Breath.” This article stated, “Chinese government officials have too 
much power to interfere in others’ lives. The birth of corruption occurred 
because the society lacked strong law regulations…therefore political reform 
is needed in order to move further on the reforms in China”.96
Noteworthy to mention, starting from late 1987, the Herald began to 
publish news and reports about privatization,  such as “Privatization Sweeps 
across Africa”, “Privatization Movement in Turkey,” and “Privatization Is A 
General Trend for the World Economy.”
 
97
 
  By reporting the privatization 
process in other countries, the Herald tried to tell readers that privatization was 
the only medicine for curing the ills of socialist countries.  The Herald 
believed that the emerging middle class would be a strong supporting base for 
democracy in China.  And a privatized, market price-oriented economy 
would gradually help the development of political democracy in China.  
In 1988, the zeal for political reforms rose again.  After the 
anti-bourgeois liberalism campaign, the demand for political democratization 
increased again and reached another peak.  Under the leadership of Zhao 
Ziyang, reformers reappeared with a stronger inclination for political reforms.  
Moving with the political winds, the Herald reappeared with a high profile.  
The paper became more critical of China’s need for political reform and, 
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compared with previous years, presented an even stronger stand.  
On January 1, 1988, the front page of the Herald published an article by 
Yu Haocheng, which called for re-thinking of the political system.  The 
article argued, “the first thing the government needs to do is to make certain 
the separation of the government and the party, and the independence of the 
judiciary.”98 Li Jun, in his article, stated, “the fundamental problem for reform 
is the problem of people’s thought…when you get deep into reform, the first 
thing encountered is the opposition of old ideas…the old concepts hence must 
therefore be eliminated, or else they will cause the failure of reform.”99
     Different from previous years, the Herald began to talk actively about 
press freedom and press reform in 1988.  In 1988, one of the big focuses of 
the Herald was on press freedom.  In April, the Herald devoted great efforts 
to organize discussions on press freedom.  The issue of April 11 was a special 
edition which organized a discussion on press freedom.  Entitled, 
“Discussion of Political Reform From Both Inside and Outside China,” the 
issue included articles such as: Zhao Haosheng, “It’s A Failure For All 
Publications To Represent the Voices of Government;” Fan Rongkang, 
“Reporting Won’t Cause Instability, Blocking Information Will Do;” Zhao 
Chaogou, “No Press Law, No Government Transparency” and Jiang Peide, 
“The Urgent Need For Press Laws.”  In their discussions, the first priority 
was to establish press laws.  According to them, national stability is 
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attainable only after the establishment of a fair and effective system of press 
law.  Press laws can prevent political corruption and promote genuine 
stability.  For a government to get support from its people, information 
transparency is a must.   
     Gong Xiangrui, a professor of Law from Peking University, in his “The 
Key for Political Reform to Succeed Is to Promote Democracy,” stated that the 
key to China’s political reform was the adoption of democratic politics, which 
should include press freedom, political pluralism, transparency of the 
government, decentralization of power, and popular participation.100
     On April 25, 1988, Zhang Zhonghou wrote a piece stating, “the success 
of reform is dependent on the realization of citizen’s subject 
consciousness…the press is responsible for delivering the truth to the 
people.”
  Gong 
went further pointing out that, currently, the most important thing the 
government had to do was to integrate political reforms with economic 
reforms, and to liberalize the control of the press. 
101  Liu Zaifu, in the issue of May 23, pointed out that “it is 
extremely important to abandon the old mode of class-struggle thinking, and 
to establish new modes of reform and innovation.”102
     On May 30, 1988, the Herald used bold type to state “The Trend for 
Reform Is Irreversible.”  The issue of July 18 discussed the failure of Nikita 
Khrushchev’s reform in Soviet Union.  The Herald analyzed the reasons for 
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the failure of the reform in the Soviet Union and articulated the needs for 
China to learn lessons from the Soviet Union.  On the front page of August 
15, 1988, the Herald carried a piece, entitled “Reform: What We Really 
Need?” in which the article talked about the importance of the establishment 
of rule of law.   In the same issue, Zhang Shuyi, a professor from Peking 
University, wrote a piece analyzing the origins of political problems - total 
government control.  From the Herald’s point of view, press reform was an 
inseparable part of political reform.  Indeed, press reform was one basis for 
supporting political reform.  
 
In 1989, along with the Chinese people’s increased zeal for political 
reforms, the Herald’s discussion of political reform and press freedom became 
more intense.  On the first issue of 1989, the headline of the front page was 
the one written by Hu Jiwei, “Establish Democratic Theory, Promote 
Democratic Politics,” in which Hu asked for political reforms based on 
democracy.103  On January 9 of that issue, a professor from China’s People’s 
University published a piece entitled “Judicial Independence Is the Crucial 
Component of Political System Reform.”  In this article, Wang pointed out 
that the problems caused by reforms so far were actually due to the lagging 
pace of the political reform, and that one crucial factor behind this was the 
lack of separation of Party and government.104
                                                        
103 See SJJJDB, January 2,1989. 
  Also in the same issue, large 
104 See SJJJDB, January 9, 1989. 
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coverage was allocated to discussion of the democratic political environment 
of Western countries.  Articles included: “Look at How America Prevents 
Corruption of Government Officials,” “The Transparency and Freedom of 
Western Politics”, and “Comments on Hungarian Political Reform: Political 
Pluralism as the Basis for Success.” 
     It is clear that during the year 1989, the Herald spent more effort and 
coverage on promoting democracy in China. This was reflected in heavy 
reporting on democracy and corruption.   In the issue of January 16, 1989, 
the Herald spent a whole page discussing why corruption was so prevalent at 
the beginning of modernization. The discussion concluded that the problem 
was due to lagging political reforms and the lack of healthy legal mechanisms.   
On January 23, Gong Yuzhi wrote a piece entitled “Study Capitalism Is a Way 
to Construct Socialism,” which called for rethinking and reconsidering 
Capitalism.  Gong argued that it was not necessary to totally reject 
Capitalism.  In contrast, we need to study the good things of Capitalism in 
order to help Socialism develop in China.  
On the front page of issue March 13, 1989, the Herald spent a whole 
page discussing the importance of information transparency.  The paper 
stated, “The transparency of information is the basis and requirement for 
citizens to participate in politics”.105
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  In the same issue, Xiao Gongqin, a 
History professor from Shanghai Normal University wrote a long piece on the 
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future of China’s reforms.  Xiao stated, “If we want the reforms to be 
successful, the system of checks and balances is the way we must to go for 
China’s future reforms.”106
     On the front page of April 8, 1989, the Herald published a survey it 
conducted among the Chinese people, which asked for “the most urgent 
problem China needs to solve.”  The Herald reported, in response to this 
question that the majority of people thought the need to deepen reforms, and to 
further promote democratic politics were the most important things China 
needed to do.  In this issue, the head of the Institute of Politics from the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yan Jiaqi, wrote a piece, claiming that, 
“the failure and all problems caused by reforms are due to the lack of a 
political responsibility system, the hope for China to move on and to develop 
is based on the adoption of democracy and rule of law.”
 
107
     On April 15, 1989, Liu Qiang, member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) told the reporters of the Herald, “political 
democracy is not only a choice of government, but also the trend of the world 
democracy movement.”
 
108
      As the time went by, the reporting of the Herald became more and 
  Wang Yizhou, a researcher from the Institution of 
World Economy and Politics discussed the differences and similarities of 
reforms in the Soviet Union and China and concluded that press freedom was 
the basis for social security and democratic society.  
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more critical and bold.  Discussion of press freedom and political democracy 
became more and more heightened.  On the front page for May 1, 1989, the 
Herald used bold type stating, “We need a free environment to tell truth and 
express ourselves freely…a corrupt government will only eat its own bitter 
fruit.”109  On May 8, Hu Jiwei wrote: “If no press freedom, then no real 
social security…democracy is the essential basis for the development of social 
security.”110
 
  The Herald spent large coverage telling the people that press 
privatization is needed for China.  As the Herald wrote, the basic function of 
the press should be to tell the truth to the public.  If the press continued to be 
used as a political tool, China’s reforms had no hope, no room to move 
forward.  The Herald insisted on this view and maintained its bold voice until 
it was closed down by the Chinese government in late May 1989.   
 
The Evolution of the Herald’s Political Reporting 
The above discussion concerns the evolution of the Herald as a dissident 
newspaper.  The following discussion is aimed to present a more detailed 
picture of the Herald’s evolution in political reporting.  The headlines, among 
other things, indicated what the story was about or what the argument of the 
article was.  The following headlines, in a chronological order, are grouped 
into five sub-categories.  They are aimed to illustrate the evolution of the 
Herald’s reporting on political issues between the years 1986 and 1989. 
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Political Reform in General 
“China’s Political Reform Needs to Be Practical” (July 7, 1986) 
“The Party Must Be Separated From the Government” (July 14, 1986) 
“Eliminate Corruption and Move towards a Democratized and Efficient 
Political System” (July 21, 1986) 
“The Need of Transparency for Government Activities” (August 4, 1986) 
“Change the Party’s Leadership Is the Way to Political System Reform” 
(August 25, 1986) 
“The Separation of Party from the Government Is the Only Way to Curb 
Bureaucracy and Corruption” (August 3, 1978) 
“Rethinking Political Reform and Rule of Law: The Need to Separate Party 
from the Government” (January 11, 1988) 
“Institutionalizing Democratic Rights” (April, 18, 1988) 
 “A Corrupt Government Will Only Eat Its Own Bitter Fruit” (May 1, 1988) 
 “The Future for China’s Reform: The Reform of Political System” (July 18, 
1988) 
 “Checks and Balance of Power: the only way to success in China’s reform” 
(October 17, 1988) 
“The Inadequacies of China’s Current Political System Reform” (April 8, 
1989) 
“Never Allow Money and Power To Get Mingled” (January 9, 1989) 
“The Independence of Law and Judiciary Is the Basis for Political Reform” 
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(January 9, 1989) 
“Why Is Corruption Easy To Develop When Economic Modernization Takes 
Off” (January 16, 1989) 
“The Problems Caused By Lack of the System of Checks and Balance” 
(January 23, 1989) 
 
Democracy and Democratization 
 “Academic Prosperity Is Dependent Upon Freedom and Democracy” (May 
26, 1986) 
“Democracy Is A Must Step to Modernization” (June 2, 1986) 
“Communist Party Members Need Democracy as Much as They Need Fresh 
Air” (August 17, 1987) 
“The Key to Political Reform Is Political Democratization” (April 18, 1988) 
“The Trend for Democratization Is Inevitable and Irreversible” (May 30, 
1988) 
 “Criticism and democracy” (August 29, 1988) 
“No Political Democratization, No Real Stability” (May 1, 1988) 
“From rule by man to rule by law” (June 20, 1988) 
“Establish Democracy Theories, Promote Political Democracy” (January 2, 
1989) 
“Judicial independence is part of political reform” (January 9, 1989) 
“The Urgent Problem for China Now Is To Promote Democracy” (April 8, 
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1988) 
“Political Democracy Cannot Be Chosen By the Government, But It Is the 
Trend for World Democratization” (April 15, 1988) 
“Government should be supervised by the public” (May 8, 1989) 
“Democracy Is the Only Basis for Social Security” (May 8, 1989) 
 
Press Freedom and Press Reform 
 “Social Progress Needs Freedom of Speech” (February 8, 1988) 
“All Publications Are the Representation of the Government Is a Failure for 
the Press” (April 11, 1988) 
“Reporting Won’t Cause Instability, Blocking Information Will Do” (April 11, 
1988) 
“Reporters Have the Responsibly To Tell the Truth” (April 11, 1988) 
“No Press Law, No Press Freedom” (April 11, 1988) 
“Create a Favorable Environment for Press Reform” (October 3, 1988) 
“Why Is the Issue of Press Privatization Avoided” (May 8, 1989) 
“Press Freedom Is the Basis for Social Security and Democratization” (May 8, 
1989) 
“No Press Freedom, No Real Society Security” (May 8, 1989) 
“There Would Be No Genuine Stability without Press Freedom” (May 8, 
1989) 
“We Need an Environment in Which We Can Speak Truth Freely” (May 1, 
 80 
1989) 
“Press Supervision Is the Obligation of Journalist Rather Than a Favor Given 
By Government Officials” (April 24, 1989) 
 
Relations between Economic and Political Reform 
“Economic Reform Will Eventually Lead To a Completely Reform” (May 26, 
1986) 
“Political Reform: from whisper to the front stage” (June 30, 1986) 
“Political Reform Should Start From the Very Top of the Leadership” (July 28, 
1986) 
“Firmly Pushing Ahead Economic and Political Reforms” (May 26, 1986) 
“Political Reform Is the Guarantee of the Economic Reform” (September 29, 
1986) 
“Economic Democratization Is A Way to Political Democratization” 
(November 13, 1986) 
 “Political Reform Is the Guarantee for the Success of Economic Reform” 
(July 13, 1987) 
“Political Reform Is the Guarantee for China’s Reforms” (August 17, 1988) 
“The Key to Political Reform Is Realization of Democratic Politics” (June 27, 
1988) 
“Economic Democratization Will Lead To Political Democratization” (July 13, 
1988) 
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“Political Reform Must Go a Step Ahead” (October 3, 1988) 
“Study Capitalism Is the Must Way to Construct Socialism” (January 23, 
1989) 
“Economic Reform Cannot Be Separated From Political Reform: seminar on 
comparative study of Chinese and Soviet reforms” (March 6, 1989) 
 
Table. 4.6 The Herald’s Reporting on Political Issues: 1980-1989 
 
Year/Topic Political 
Reform 
Democratization Integration Press 
Freedom 
1980 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 1 0 
1982 3 0 2 0 
1983 6 0 5 0 
1984 6 1 3 0 
1985 4 3 1 1 
1986 23 13 36 1 
1987 7 3 21 2 
1988 52 19 30 12 
1989 23 11 22 18 
Total 124 58 121 34 
Source：Shijie jingji daobao:1980-1989 [The World Economic Herald: 1980-1989], in 
microfilm. Shanghai: Zhongguo shijie jingji xuehui [China Society of World 
Economics]: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yanjiusuo [World Economics 
Institute of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], 
 
The above examples indicate that although the Herald changed its 
reporting policy from economic-oriented to political-oriented after 1985, the 
paper’s reporting on political issues had a sub-evolution—it evolved gradually. 
     It is clear that in 1986, the Herald’s reporting on political issues was 
largely focused on government administrative reforms.  It asked for greater 
openness and transparency for the government’s operation.  The Herald also 
opposed political corruption and centralization of the Party’s power.  It asked 
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for separation of the Party from the government.  In the same year, another 
major area of the Herald’s focus was relations between economic and political 
reforms.  It articulated clearly that in order to further push economic reforms 
forward, political reforms was necessary.  Yet, in 1986, democracy, political 
democratization, and the freedom of press were not the primary concerns of 
the Herald - they were not mentioned much.   The Herald shifted its focus to 
political democratization only after 1986.  Starting from 1987, the Herald’s 
reporting coverage on democracy and democratization increased significantly, 
and more importantly, it became increasingly bold and critical, reaching a 
peak in 1988 and 1989.  In 1988 and 1989, the Herald discussed a wide range 
of issues central to political democratization in China.    The Herald’s active 
engagement in the discussion of press reform began after 1987.   In early 
1988, the Herald devoted several special editions to press freedom and press 
reform.  The paper made a strong call for freedom of the press, which later 
became a key slogan of the student protest in the 1989 Pro-democracy 
Movement.  In general, the headlines noted above were illustrative of the 
boldness of the Herald in its advocacy.  Citizens should be allowed to voice 
their views and to criticize the Party and government. The press should be 
given a free hand to inform the people of what was happening.  To sum up, as 
the above discussion suggests, the Herald’s political reporting evolved 
gradually over time.  It started from a relatively moderate position in 
discussing of political issues to a later bold and critical stance on political 
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reforms.  Without doubt, the Herald was outspokenly daring in pushing 
forward an agenda for political development in China.  
The paper was closed down by the Chinese government in May 1989.  
The paper was criticized as a forum for propagating liberalization.  It 
advocated a multi-party system in politics, directed to the West in culture, and 
advertised privatization in economy.  As the People’s Daily said, “The Herald 
belittled the Socialist system and praised the Capitalist system, saying that 
while Capitalists worry about too much fat, socialists are tortured by too much 
lean.”111
 
  The Herald was accused of being the major source of the turmoil in 
Shanghai in 1989.  
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V. Conclusion 
     The Herald was closed down by the Chinese government in early May 
1989.  The paper was charged with promoting political democracy and 
causing social instability in China.  The chief editor Qin Benli was removed 
from his position and forced to undergo self-criticism.  Qin died of stomach 
cancer on April 15, 1991.   As many scholars have already noted, the closing 
of the Herald ignited Chinese people’s desire for political change.  As a result, 
massive groups of students marched into the streets and asked for greater 
political freedom on June 4, 1989.  After the crackdown on student protests 
on June 4, 1989, China entered into a politically more conservative period.  
The government’s control of the press has increased so that the press now is 
under much tighter control by the government.  
     As this study shows, the Herald had a profound influence on Chinese 
society in the 1980s.  By introducing advanced thoughts and bold criticisms 
about both negative and positive sides of the reform, the paper greatly 
enlightened people, especially college students and intellectuals.  The 1980s 
was a special period for China.  After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the 
Chinese government launched a series of reforms in China.  These reforms 
opened China to the outside World and liberalized Chinese society to a certain 
degree.  It was in this historical context that the Herald was born and 
flourished.   Established as an economic newspaper, the Herald successfully 
prospered by sticking closely to the government’s reform policies.  The 
Chinese government’s priority of economic reforms directly helped the 
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development of the Herald.  And in turn, the Herald also contributed to the 
development of the nation’s economic reforms.  As other scholars have 
pointed out, there was a positive interplay between the Herald and China’s 
economic reforms.  As Chang Won Ho observed, among the economic 
newspapers generated in those years, the Herald could be counted “as an 
authority on both world and national economic issues.”112
     The Herald’s nine year life-span can be divided into two stages.  The 
first is from 1980 to 1985, and the second is from 1986 to 1989.  The Herald 
in its first period was an “economic herald,” and a “political herald” in the 
second period.  Between the years of 1980 and 1985, the Herald could be 
viewed as a “mouthpiece” of the government.  The paper reported on 
government reform policies in a timely manner.  Due to strong support from 
renowned scholars and government officials, the Herald never hesitated to be 
bold in what it published.   And in turn, the insightful reporting and bold 
criticisms helped the Herald gain support from the government.  In fact, the 
Herald won strong support from the reformers in the CCP.  Prime Minister 
Zhao Ziyang was the most powerful “back mountain” for the Herald.    
 
     However, during the early years’ of reform, its focus was primarily on 
the economic sphere.  Political reform lagged far behind.  With the 
deepening of reforms after 1985, many problems emerged and posed serious 
threats to China’s reform projects.  People’s voices for political change 
                                                        
112 Chang, Mass Media in China, 128. 
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increased tremendously.  Along with the changing political climate, the 
Herald shifted its reporting focus from economics to politics, and gradually 
challenged the Party line.  In fact, the course of the Herald’s development 
mirrored the trajectory ups and downs of policy changes which shock China in 
the 1980s.  In the words of Liu Binyan，”At the media sphere, 1985 was the 
worst year to date, and 1987 was far worse because of the antiliberalization 
campaign.” 113
In the years between 1986 and 1989, the Herald was actively engaged in 
promoting political reforms, democratization, integration of political with 
economic reforms, and press freedom.  The reasons for the Herald’s decision 
to move towards a “political herald,” as discussed in this study, were 1) the 
changing political climate of the 1980s; 2) the reform-minded leadership of 
Qin Benli and young politically active intellectuals.  Under the 
reform-minded leadership of Qin Benli, and liberal minded new editors, the 
 This point could be made also for Herald.  The Herald 
increased its political reporting in late 1985, reaching its first peak in 1986.  
1987, however, was a nadir for the Herald’s political reporting because the 
government tightened controls on the press as well as on the reformers.  Yet, 
1988 and 1989 witnessed a resurgence, reaching another peak of the Herald’s 
political zeal.  These two years also were the peak of the Chinese people’s 
demands for political reform and political freedom.    
                                                        
113 Liu Binyan, “Press Freedom: Particles in the Air” in Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of 
China: the Interplay of Politics and Journalism, New York : Guilford Press, 1990. 
Also see, Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty : a memoir by China's foremost 
journalist, New York : Pantheon Books, 1990. 
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Herald maintained its bold voice and political enthusiasm throughout the years 
from 1986 to 1989.   
     Scholars often characterize the Herald as an “unofficial” newspaper that 
was distinct from the government control [Wright, 1990; Hsiao and Yang, 
1989].114
Although the Herald was financially independent, the Herald was not 
completely independent from the control of the government.  Close ties with 
government officials gave the Herald unusual protection in support of the high 
quality news and commentaries of the Herald.  However, this close 
relationship had its problems too.  When the reformers lost power in 1987, 
the Herald lost its protection, too, and consequently faced the possibility of 
being closed down.  In other words, the Herald tied its fate and editorial 
directions to the reformers in the CCP.  This certainly helped the paper’s 
development in its early life.  However, with the unstable situation in China’s 
politics of the late 1980s, it was not surprising that the Herald had a short life.    
  This view, however, simplifies and obscures complex relationships 
that the Herald had with the Chinese reform-minded officials, particularly the 
Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang administration.  Not only reformers, but also 
the Chinese government gave certain amounts of support to the Herald during 
its early years from 1980 to 1985.  That is why so many newspapers, 
including government controlled ones such as the People’s Daily, wrote to 
congratulate the paper on its fifth anniversary in 1985.   
                                                        
114 See Kate Wright, "The political fortunes”: 121-132. 
Hsiao Ching-chang and Yang Mei-rong, “Don’t Force to Lie”: 111-121 
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To illustrate, for example, the circulation of the Herald had a 
tremendous increase during its first five years from 1980 to 1989, and then the 
paper’s circulation dropped after 1985 (see table 3.2).  One possible reason 
was the reduced support and subscriptions from the government.  As 
discussed in previous chapters, the Chinese government gave great initial 
support to the Herald.  Government controlled newspapers such as the 
People’s Daily publicly praised the Herald.  However, with the Herald’s 
increased reporting on sensitive political issues, the Chinese government 
gradually withdrew its support.  The reduced subscription from the 
government might be one reason behind the Herald’s reduced circulation 
during later period. 
     The Herald has been commonly understood as a dissident newspaper.  
However, by tracing the founding and development of the Herald, we can see 
that the Herald was not established as a dissident newspaper.  At the 
beginning, the editors did not have a long-term goal for the paper.  They 
developed their long-term goal only after the paper gained support from 
readers as well as from reformers.  The paper’s move towards political 
dissidence was a gradual one.  To call the Herald a dissident newspaper, it is 
necessary to make clear that this describes the Herald after 1985.  Associated 
with the ups and downs of China’s reforms, the Herald moved from a paper 
that once supported by government officials to one finally subjected to 
shutdown in May 1989.  The Herald’s development was dependent on the 
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reforms and the paper’s eventual suspension was a politically tragic 
consequence of the reforms. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Cha Bianqiu 檫边球 
Chen Hansheng 陈翰笙 
Chu Baoyi 褚葆一 
Da Gongbao 大公报 
Fan Rongkang 范荣康 
Hu Jiwei 胡绩伟 
Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 
Gong Xiangrui 龚祥瑞 
Jiang Peide 蒋培德 
Jiang Zemin 江泽民 
Jiefang Ribao 解放日报 
Liu Zaifu 刘再复 
Liu Binyan 刘宾雁 
Lu Dingyi 陆定一 
Ma Hong 马洪 
Qian Junrui 钱俊瑞 
Qin Benli 钦本立 
Renmin Ribao 人民日报 
Ruan Jiangning 阮江宁 
Shanghai Qingnian bao 上海青年报 
Shekou 蛇口 
Shen Zhen 深圳 
Shen Bao 申报 
Shijie Jingji Daobao 世界经济导报 
Sun Wei 孙维 
Su Shaozhi 苏紹智 
Sun Huairen 孙怀仁 
Wan Li 万里 
Wang Daohan 汪道涵 
Wang Yizhou 王逸舟 
Wang Xinxii 王欣新 
Wenhui Bao 文汇报 
Xiao Gongqin 萧功秦 
Xin Wenbao 新闻报 
Xinhua Yuekan 新华月刊 
Xue Muqiao 薛暮桥 
Xu Xuehan 徐雪寒 
Yang Peixin 杨培新 
Yan Jiaqi 严家其 
Yuan Geng 袁庚 
Yu Haocheng 于浩成 
Yu Qihong 郁奇虹 
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Yu Guangyuan 于光远 
Zhang Zhonghou 张宗厚 
Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 
Zhao Haosheng 赵浩生 
Zhao Chaogou 赵超构 
Zhang Shuyi 张顺义 
Zhang Weiguo 张伟国 
Zhu Houzhe 朱厚泽 
Zhou Qi 周骐 
Zhongguo xinwen nianjian 中国新闻年鉴 
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